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The point of departure for this chapter is that in developing countries SMEs2 are responsible 
for the largest part of employment and a significant share of added value. And that 
innovation policy supporting the particularities of SMEs has been widely ignored 
(occasionally SMEs have even been discriminated). This chapter aims at shedding some 
light on the immensely complicated issue of innovation policy for SMEs in developing 
countries, or more specifically Asian SMEs. The chapter applies the so-called regional 
innovation systems approach. In this paper, we analyze four clusters of SMEs that have 
been especially successful in entering the global market; special attention is paid to the so-
called soft infrastructure, the industry specific needs for cluster (e.g. interaction) and RIS 
dynamics/polices (e.g. needs for devolution; industry specific needs for building knowledge 
creating institutions).The chapter is structured as follows. After introducing stylized facts on 
SMEs innovative performance attention is turned to the theoretical framework. Taking into 
account the localized nature of SMEs economic activity, our level of analysis is the regional 
system of innovation (RIS). We provide a general introduction, contextualize this to Asian 
situation, and introduce the industry differences (inspired by Pietrobelli and Rabelotti’s 
typology). Then we turn to the empirical section where special attention is paid to the four 
cases. Finally, we turn to drawing general conclusions on innovation policies and need for 
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1.  Introduction  
Among policy-makers and academics the current consensus suggests that innovation 
is a crucial factor in generating economic growth and development in the developed 
world (Lundvall 1992, Von Hippel 1988).  Traditionally, the importance of 
innovations is ascribed to the new competitive landscape stemming from increased 
economic globalization, new types of regulation of international trade (often 
misleadingly labeled deregulation, Amin 2004), improved ICT-technologies and 
lower prices on transportation (Fröbel et al 1980). In this structural explanation firms 
in the developed world are forced to innovate to maintain their competitiveness since 
firms located in developing countries can catch-up by applying imitation-based 
strategies and produce almost identical products to those manufactured in the 
developed world at a cheaper price (Asheim and Vang, forthcoming). Since firms in 
developing countries have been conceptualized as imitators it is not surprising that the 
importance of innovation for developing countries has only recently begun to be 
acknowledged. Traditionally, growth, catching up and development in less 
industrialized countries has been considered a matter of exploiting their comparative 
advantage in terms of low factor costs (especially labor costs).  We do not wish to 
debate the reasons for focusing on countries’ comparative advantages. However, we 
argue that the models still suffer on several accounts. They tend to assume a 
mechanistic process which ignores the importance of firm’s innovative practices in 
the process of upgrading in the value chain, the particularities of firms in developing 
countries and how the (lack of) systemic features in the institutional support system 
affects these innovative practices. Thus the increasing interest of the governments in 
the developing countries on innovation policies should be welcome. But before 
uncritically embracing these initiatives there is a need to throw Poison Hemlock in the 
mug. 
 
The problem is that in developing countries the general trend has been to follow the 
innovation policies of the developed world which, we will argue, might not be the 
most appropriate thing to do. In the developed world innovation policy has been 
largely dominated by technology policy (Lundvall and Borrás 2004), initially as a 
consequence of the so-called linear model of innovation which place R&D in the 
center of the innovation process and primarily focus on (radical) product innovations. 
Following this model, governments have supported mainly fast growing and large 
firms in technology intensive industries, such as Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), Biotechnology or Nanotechnologies that showed rapid growth 
and high added value.  
Following the innovation policy of the developed countries, many governments in the 
South decided also to implement large programs on ICT, Biotech or Nanotech to 
stimulate growth and catch up with the industrialized world. It is not the purpose of 
this article to discuss the adequacy of these high-tech oriented policies in the 
developing world as such and we do acknowledge that some of the countries have 
obtained very successful results (India, Korea or Singapore are crucial examples). 
However, we argue that most economic activity in developing countries is outside the 
high-tech industries and is based on small and medium sized firms (SMEs). Clarysse 
and Uytterhaegen (1999) estimate that only 3% of the SMEs are in high-tech 
industries and receive the attention of policy makers
1. If the government wants to 
support innovation in other industries a set of complementary policies is needed 
targeting the main economic actors (SMEs) and most important industries (usually 
traditional and natural-resource based) in the economy.   
The point of departure for this chapter is that in developing countries SMEs
2 are 
responsible for the largest part of employment and a significant share of added value. 
And that innovation policy supporting the particularities of SMEs has been widely 
ignored (occasionally SMEs have even been discriminated).  
This chapter aims at shedding some light on the immensely complicated issue of 
innovation policy for SMEs in developing countries, or more specifically Asian SMEs. 
In other words one can say that the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the type of 
innovation policy needed to reach the 65% potential innovators which have been 
ignored by current policies. Based on historical examples it is not surprising that 
Asian SMEs should be targeted. The Asian SMEs have played a vital role in the 
development of the tiger economies in East Asia (Taiwan, South Korea) and their 
younger siblings in South East Asia (Malaysia, Thailand) and are among the most 
important sources of employment in the rest of Asia, hence there are good reasons to 
look into the type of innovation policy that is needed to facilitate their growth and 
                                                 
1 Currently the specific programs targeting SMEs in Asia found in almost all countries are high-tech 
oriented. Most of them (if not all) are targeting specific groups of firms (start-ups) or specific sectors 
(ICT, software) where there is a high probability of finding high-tech SMEs. This group however only 
represents about the 3% of the SME population. This means that the majority of SMEs is ignored 
almost completely by all innovation policies. Of the remaining 87%, approximately 65% are 
considered to be technology users or potential innovators (Clarysse and Uytterhaegen 1999). 
 
2 How is the concept SME used in this paper? SMEs is constituted by a variety of types of firms in 
terms of size of financial assets and/or number of employees. No single coherent definition exists 
(OECD 2002). The SMEs range from formally established firms engaged in traditional manufacturing 
over semi-formal sweatshops to informal – and occasionally criminal – activities involving the house or 
family only. Moreover, some are producing intermediaries to firms in global value chains while others 
produce end-products to their regional markets only. The definitions used in national statistics are also 
different from each country in Asia (and the rest of the world for that matter).  Currently the SME 
department of the World Bank considers the following definitions: microenterprises (up to 10 
employees, total assets of up to $10,000 and total annual sales of up to $100,000); small enterprises (up 
to 50 employees, total assets and total sales of up to $3 million; medium enterprise (p to 300 employees, 
total assets and total sales up to $15 million). We focus on the formal sectors of SMEs in this chapter. 
 competitiveness.  As the Asian innovation systems are primarily developed around 
supporting the large firm or high-tech firms there is also an urgent need to pay 
attention to redesigning the innovation systems to integrate the small and medium size 
firms. Since these issues are as said immensely complicated and calls for both 
theoretical and empirical novelty the paper will be explorative in nature, hence cannot 
do full justice to the diversity of conditions shaping the innovation-based 
competitiveness of Asian SMEs.   
 
Asian SMEs have traditionally tended to concentrate spatially with other SMEs 
operating in the same industry. And this is especially clear in traditional industries and 
resources based industries in Asian countries. The regional dimension is crucial as 
Asian SMEs tend to be more dependent on regional conditions and regional support. 
This is partly due to the fragmentation and the transitional character (Lundvall et al, 
forthcoming) of the national innovation system in many Asian countries. 
 
The chapter applies the so-called regional innovation systems approach. Regional 
Innovation systems can be seen as a “constellation of industrial clusters surrounded by 
innovation supporting organizations” (Asheim and Coenen 2005). In this sense, 
industrial clusters represent the production system/part of the regional innovation 
system. In the RIS approach industrial clusters are defined as the geographic 
concentration of firms in the same or related industries (Porter 1998, Pietrobelli and 
Rabelotti 2004, for a critique see Martin and Sunley 2003). In well-functioning 
clusters proximity facilitates the knowledge and information circulation which is 
needed in the particular industry in the particular context. The recent adaptation of the 
RIS approach to the Asian context (Asheim and Vang, forthcoming) will be used as a 
departure point in the discussion.  
In the context of RIS two important aspects need to be highlighted. Contrary to more 
traditional approaches to innovation and upgrading a RIS approach stresses that 
supporting SMEs in their innovation-oriented upgrading process is not only a matter 
of facilitating the access to technology but of providing what we later refer to as soft 
infrastructure (increase qualification of the human resources, facilitate organizational 
change, support social capital). Most small firms will not be able to handle this 
process alone. They rely on interactive arrangements of horizontal or vertical 
character that assures the appropriate information and knowledge transfer. 
Arrangements such as subcontracting, clustering or collective support systems 
underpin the needed information and knowledge circulation (Berry et al 2002).
3 
Furthermore, collective arrangements facilitate the access to the resources needed in 
the innovation process (qualified human capital, technology, financial capital, etc). 
In this paper, we analyze four clusters of SMEs that have been especially successful in 
entering the global market; special attention is paid to the so-called soft infrastructure, 
the industry specific needs for cluster (e.g. interaction) and RIS dynamics/polices (e.g. 
needs for devolution; industry specific needs for building knowledge creating 
institutions). Case studies as the standard reasons constraining SMEs innovative 
performance are considered to be rather well-known. By applying Pietrobelli and 
Rabelotti’s SMEs typology (specialized suppliers, complex production systems, 
                                                 
3 Malmberg and Maskell (2004) recently reduced interaction in clusters to be based on observability 
only; this might be relevant in some industrial clusters but mainly for a minor segment based on 
physical production. resource-based industries and traditional manufacturing industries) we strive towards 
providing some degree of totality of (relevant) industries. One case pr. industry is 
included. More specifically Bangalore’s Software industry is presented as an example 
on specialized suppliers. The Thai automobile industry’s clusters are examples of a 
complex production system. Taiwan’s orchid industry as a case of a resource-based 
industry, and the Jepara furniture cluster in Indonesia illustrates a traditional 
manufacturing industry.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. After introducing stylised facts on 
SMEs innovative performance attention is turned to the theoretical framework. Taking 
into account the localized nature of SMEs economic activity, our level of analysis is 
the regional system of innovation (RIS). We provide a general introduction, 
contextualize this to Asian situation, and introduce the industry differences (inspired 
by Pietrobelli and Rabelotti’s typology).  Then we turn to the empirical section where 
special attention is paid to the four cases. Finally, we turn to drawing general 
conclusions on innovation policies and need for restructuring of Asian innovation 
systems (the accent is on the former).  
2. Stylized facts on Asian SMEs innovative performance 
No matter which indicators one use SMEs comes out as constituting one of the most 
important sources of economic growth and development in Asia (and developing 
countries as such) (see table 1).  SMEs account for one third to two thirds of the 
turnover of the private sector (OECD 2002) and constitute the vast majority of the 
business establishments and the entrepreneurs in Asian  countries (Dhungana 2003).  
--insert table 1 here ---- 
The SMEs are responsible for around 80% of the workforce within the industrial 
sectors (Das 2003), which in turn has an impact on their ability to grow and innovate 
as SMEs often facilitate the birth and expansion of large-scale industries. The Asian 
dragon economies provide ample amounts evidence in support of this.  Das, for 
example, finds that in the South Korea “much of the increase in employment of 
factories with 100 or more workers since 1960s came from small firms that grew 
larger and larger over time” (Das 2003). 
While the SMEs plays a prominent role in most industries in developing countries and 
has been an integrated part of the high tech industries in Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore it should be emphasized that most of the added value is concentrated in a 
few traditional or natural-resource based industries. Usually the SMEs are found in 
industries producing food and beverages, jewellery, leather, textiles, wood and 
furniture and handicrafts, and so forth (Dhungana 2003). 
Thus although some studies (Gellman Research Associates 1976 and 1982 cf OECD 
2002 and Audretsch 1995) suggested that SMEs are more innovative that large firms, 
at least when counting innovations per employee, the majority of studies show that 
large firms are responsible for the greatest part of the inputs and outputs of innovation. 
Large firms account for the largest proportion of national expenditure in innovation 
and R&D and provide the greatest number of new products and services and the 
proportion of exports and turnover due to new products and services increases with the size of the firm (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2002) and the multiple analysis on the 
Community innovation survey).   
To the extent the experience from the developed world could be seen as relevant for 
Asian countries two conclusions seems to have come to the policy-makers mind. 
Asian countries suffer a serious draw back due to the dominance of SMEs and 
traditional industries (see table 1) and their innovation policies should focus on the 
large firms. Without wanting to idealize the SMEs this would be a premature 
conclusion, as the previously mentioned research tend to ignore that SMEs show 
better innovation performance than large firms in relative terms. That is, relative to 
their investment in R&D and innovation, they introduce more process and product 
innovations (Acs and Audretsch (1990), Sanchez and Chaminade 1998, Andreassi 
2003).  This puzzling result seem to be pointing out that in SMEs, non-technological 
factors such as the managerial skills, the qualification of the employees, the 
organizational changes or the informal and formal networks are crucial elements 
explaining successful innovation and not R&D. Moreover, investment in innovative 
activities in SMEs is growing at a faster path than that of large firms. Between 1985 
and 1995 in the US, investment in R&D by SMEs tripled, while the growth rate for 
large firms was only 20%.  Evidence also suggests that the propensity to patent 
increases as firm size decreases (OECD 2002).  
This claim is also supported by a methodological consideration. The case studies and 
country surveys used in support of large firms usually rely on formalised innovation 
indicators. But it is generally accepted that innovation processes in SMEs tend to be 
less formalised that in larger firms
4.  Often SMEs do not have a formal innovation 
strategy, R&D department or scientific and engineering staff, and this is especially 
true for developing countries (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal 2004). For this reason 
national and international statistics on R&D tend to underestimate the innovation 
effort of SMEs as SMEs always show very poor R&D performance. Innovation takes 
place in the form of incremental innovations, that is, small gradual changes less likely 
to be the result of heavy investments in R&D (RICYT 2001) but more soft factors” 
such as organizational change, increased qualification of the human resources or the 
participation in formal or informal networks.   
Hence, to conclude this section we will argue that, when analysing innovation in 
SMEs, specially in Asian and other developing countries, it is necessary to go beyond 
traditional indicators on R&D investment (technology) and focus on non-
technological factors such as the skills of the human resources, the organisation and 
the formal and the external relationships of the firm –that is, what we consider as soft 
infrastructure of the RIS. By doing so, it is possible to explain why SMEs with low 
R&D investment have relatively better performance in terms on new products and 
services than large firms and subsequently why and how Asian countries can benefit 
from targeting their innovation policies to SMEs. 
 
3. Theoretical framework – SMEs in Regional Innovation Systems 
 
This section introduces RIS and contextualizes it to the Asian context. The point of 
departure for all innovation systems research is that innovation is the result of an 
                                                 
4 Although there are important differences by sectors, as we will argue later in this report.  interactive learning process (Lundvall 1992). Regional innovation systems stress the 
regional clusters which is crucial for Asian SMEs. Their interaction - at best - often 
takes place at the local level, with firms and other institutions located in the same 
geographical area. The extensive literature on regional innovation systems and 
clusters has long acknowledged the role of regional embedded networks in the 
innovation process of SMEs (Asheim et al. 2003,  Cooke and Morgan 1998, Cooke 
and Will 1999,  Schmitz 1992), also in developing countries (Albu 1997, Bitran 2004, 
Giuliani 2004, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2004; UNIDO 1997 and 2004, Giuliani and 
Bell 2005).  Moreover, this literature explicitly finds that mostly SMEs external 
relations are more confined to the region than those of large firms (Cooke and Morgan 
1998, Asheim et al. 2003). Kaufman and Todtling argue that one of the reasons for 
this is that SMEs are more dependent on tacit knowledge and less capable of 
searching for and using codified knowledge which forces them to rely more on 
personal ways of transferring (tacit) knowledge and on learning-by-doing and –
interacting..  
 
In addition we emphasize in accordance with Pavitt (1984), Archibugi and Pietrobelli 
(2003), Asheim and Gertler (2003) and Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2004) that the 
interaction and need for institutions providing knowledge support for SMEs is 
industry specific. This is evident in the Asian cases discussed in this paper, as SMEs 
in Asia tend to concentrate geographically with other firms operating in the same 
(often craft) industry.   
 
 
3.1. What is meant by RIS? 
  
According to Cooke et al., 1998 a RIS is defined as a system in which firms and other 
organizations are systematically engaged in interactive learning through an 
institutional milieu characterized by embeddedness. The crux of this definition lies in 
the notion of embeddedness. This refers to the importance of personal relations and 
networks ingrained in local social and cultural institutions (Granovetter 1985). 
Without it the definition would equal the definition of a national innovation system 
written small.   
 
Additionally, a regional innovation system can be conceptualized as regional clusters 
surrounded by ‘supporting’ knowledge organizations (Asheim and Isaksen 2002). 
Thereby the regional innovation system is boiled down to two main types of actors 
and the interactions between them. The first actors concern the companies in the main 
industrial clusters in a region as well as their support industries (e.g. customers, 
suppliers). The second type of actors backing up the innovative performance of the 
first type of actors include research and higher education institutes (universities, 
technical colleges and R&D-institutes), technology transfer agencies, vocational 
training organizations, business associations, finance institutions etcetera. These 
knowledge creating and diffusing organizations hold important competence, train 
labor, provide necessary finance etc. to support regional innovativeness.  
 
The notion of a regional innovation system involves a strategic institutionalization of 
innovation between the private and public sectors in a systemic way, constituting an 
institutional infrastructure as a ‘superstructure’ to the production structure of a region. 
The concept ‘region’ recognizes the existence of an important level of industry governance between the national and the local (cluster or firms) (Asheim and Cooke 
1999). Regions are, thus, seen as important bases of economic coordination at the 
meso-level: ‘the region is increasingly the level at which innovation is produced 
through regional networks of innovators, local clusters and the cross-fertilizing effects 
of research institutions’ (Lundvall and Borrás 1997, p. 39). To varying degrees, 
regional governance is expressed in both private representative organizations such as 
branches of industry associations and chambers of commerce, and public 
organizations such as regional ministries with devolved powers concerning enterprise 
and innovation support, particularly for SMEs.  
 
The systemic dimension of ‘RIS’ derives in part from this partner-based character 
associated with innovation in networks. While, as Lundvall (1992) puts it, an 
innovation system is a set of relationships between entities or nodal points involved in 
innovation, it is really much more than this. Such relationships, to be systemic, must 
involve some degree of inter-dependence; not all relationships may be equally strong 
all of the time, but some may be. Stressing interdependency is crucial in a 
developmental context where, as we have explained above, the development model to 
a large extent is based on indigenous (in at least initial phases) capital and knowledge 
sources. The challenge is thus for most clusters in developing countries to attract 
TNCs (and other capital influxes) and gradually develop a situation of 
interdependency between the TNC and the local/regional small firms as well as 
between the TNCs and the institutional support system.  
 
Finally, RIS stresses the importance of interactive learning. The system of innovation 
perspective highlights the behavior of local actors with respect to three key elements 
in the innovation process (Mylteka and Farinelli 2000): learning, linkage and 
investment. Learning refers to the absorptive capacity of the organizations 
participating in the system, their ability to capture and use the knowledge available in 
the system. Linkage refers to the formal and informal interaction with other 
organizations in the system of innovation and investment, refer to the access to the 
required financial resources for innovation.  
 
A developed and continuously developing absorptive capacity is a prerequisite for 
firms and regions to engage efficiently in interactive learning (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990, Zahra and George 2002). Absorptive capacity as conceptualized in this paper is 
considered as a dynamic capability (capability because it refer to the skills, routines 
and habits constituting the absorptive capacity (Nelson and Winter 1982) that allows 
firm and/or region to take advantage of knowledge and information in their 
environment, process it and commercialize it (subsequently making organizations 
change allowing firms to take advantages of new information). We suggest that a) a 
firm’s absorptive capacity is a function of its prior internal knowledge – being tacit or 
codified – and the institutional setting (referring to among other aspects how social 
capital allows for knowledge to circulate and how public institutions serve this 
knowledge circulation) and b) that a region has an absorptive capacity (which is a 
function of the individual firms absorptive capacity, human capital (formal and tacit), 
social capital and financial capital), hence we oppose seeing regional absorptive 
capacity as simply an aggregate of the individual firms absorptive capacity. Contrary 
to more traditional definitions we stress the need for firms, government organizations 
and institutions to be dynamic. Being dynamic refer to changing the organizational 
structure, support systems etc. according to needs for producing new products; not just the use of knowledge from the environment by static firms to produce new 
products. Absorptive capacity building is about investing in training (human capital) 
and engaging in collaboration between firms and university (not necessary co-located 
universities due to the high reliance on codified practices and modular processes). 
This allows the firms to both develop its internal absorptive capacity as well as 
utilizing other firm’s and organizations results of their absorptive capacities. From a 
policy maker perspective, building absorptive capacity apart from transforming 
organizations (private and public) into organizations more tuned into learning 
(striking a balance between exploration and exploitation, as March would coin it) 
depends on creating social capital. Inclusive social capital allows for exchange of 
complex and important information, which cannot be written into contracts.  
 
SMEs potential to benefit from this regional or local system of innovation is more 
limited than large firms and, at the same time, they depend much more than large 
firms on the conditions of the regional innovation system. Large firms usually have 
the resources to access the required technology, hire qualified human resources by 
their own or introduce new managerial techniques. SMEs, especially in developing 
countries, on the other hand, usually need to coordinate collective actions to for 
example, share the costs of the acquisition of machinery that will be used by all, 
access financial resources, as they will not be able to do it on their own. These 
collective actions usually take place between producers localized in a certain area, in 
some cases, based on existing long social relationships that have built trust and 
through the initiative of more qualified entrepreneurs or the support of the 
government.  The role of the regional innovation system for SMEs in developing 
countries is crucial.  
 
 
3.2. RIS and Asian Countries  
 
In this section we point to the stylized facts of constrains to economic development in 
Asian countries in a RIS perspective; the limited size of the paper prevents of from 
paying much details to the different degrees of industrialization/development in the 
Asian countries. In accordance with most studies in development research RIS 
stresses the importance of physical capital (hard infrastructure), social capital (soft 
infrastructure), human capital (education and training) and financial capital. What RIS 
adds to this is the systemic propensities and emphasis on interactive aspects in a 
territorial and industry context. The hard infrastructure we consider more of a 
contingency than an actual part of the more theoretical aspects; thus it will only be 
treated in this manner. Most attention will be paid to the latter aspects; and to repeat 
special attention is paid to absorptive capacity and the development of local 
embededness of the transnational sources of capital, technology and knowledge for 
SMEs upgrading. The importance of the different factors varies according to the 
dominating industrial knowledge base in the region in question and naturally the 
already existing ‘endowment’ of the particular factors.
5
 
3.2.1. Human capital and organizational capabilities (soft infrastructure) in the 
Asian context 
                                                 
5 Physical capital as infrastructure is crucial for economic development but this is not the core 
area of RIS hence we just refer to UNDP 2004 for detailed elaborations on this topic.  According to Gary Becker – the grand old man of human capital – ‘Human capital 
refers to the skills, education, health, and training of individuals’ (1998, p. 1). Human 
capital is considered a corner stone in development (Romer, 1990). One of the most 
important drawbacks of developing countries is the poor supply of qualified general 
and subsequently industry specific human capital. As a proxi for the lack of general 
human capital one can use illiteracy-rates.  And adult illiteracy still reaches the two 
digits in some countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia (World Bank, 2003). 
Enrolment in secondary education is around 50%
6 while most of the developed world 
reaches 90-100 per cent and, with the exception of some countries like Korea, the 
enrolment in tertiary education is between 10-20 per cent.  The lack of basic education 
is constraining the acquisition of firms and industry specific knowledge which is a 
prerequisite for innovative activities. This is especially so for SMEs, as Kaufmann 
and Todlingdt point out, SMEs need to use the human resources more intensively than 
large firms in their innovation process.  But as a consequence of the poorly developed 
educational system SMEs in Asian countries have to rely on employing a significant 
portion of poor and low-skill workforce (Das 2003). This constrains the firms 
absorptive capacity i.e. the ability to utilise available information and the information 
and knowledge that comes from interaction with users.   
 
Competencies when it comes to incremental improvement, reorganization of 
production processes or cultivating craftsmanship knowledge, are highly limited. This 
means that firms have a limited prior knowledge, to paraphrase Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990), of modern production, thus only limited absorptive capacity facing quite 
severe challenges when building the absorptive capacity. 
 
But what is the impact of a rich or poor RIS in terms of the supply of timely and 
qualified human capital for the Asian SMEs? The lack of qualified human resources, 
the poor managerial skills of the manager and the difficulties accessing strategic 
information are considered to be the main obstacles to innovation in SMEs in Asian 
countries. But there are successful stories in Asia that demonstrate that upgrading is 
possible. The amount of training of the management can influence the performance 
and survival of firms, specially SMEs (Murphy 2002). For example, Taiwanese 
SMEs, have undergone a tremendous upgrading in the formal competencies of the 
management in the last years.  
Even when the RIS provides the necessary supply of human capital, SMEs will only 
benefit from qualified human capital if the right organisational setting is in place. 
Both human capital and organizational issues determine the absorptive capacity of the 
firm and the region. As the OECD states “[O]ne key element of innovation is 
organisation. … Organisation is essentially a process for the gathering, management 
and use of information, and for the implementation of decisions based on such 
information. Such processes have a strong intangible dimension, but taken together 
they make up the learning capacity of the firm and as such are a central element in 
innovation capability. These are specific institutional "rules of the game" which 
regulate possible modes of organisation on a broad level”. (OECD 1997: 43) 
                                                 
6 Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are the exception, with net enrolment rates in primary school close to 
100%.  Understanding that organizational issues also play a role in the absorptive capacity of 
the firms is important from the RIS perspective. And this is not because governments 
can supply “organizational capabilities” -as they can provide human capital-, but 
because investing in training is only one variable in the equation; if firms in the RIS 
do not have the ability to absorb the skilled labor and use it to upgrade (move up in 
the value chain), all training efforts will be dismissed. In other words, the soft 
infrastructure of a RIS comprises both the provision of skilled human capital and the 
absorptive capacity of the firms, which in turn also depends on their employees and 
organizational issues.   
 
SMEs organisational issues differ substantially from large firms in their degree of 
formalisation and in the strong dependencies from the manager (owner/founder of the 
firm). The strategy, the culture or the decision making procedures are mostly tacit. 
Knowledge is transmitted inside the firm by learning by doing and consequently face-
to-face interaction. Also decision making process differ significantly between large 
and small and medium-sized enterprises. In the former no single individual is 
responsible for the decisions. In SMEs, on the other hand, almost all decisions are 
taken by the owners or the managing director (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal 2004), as 
argue above. This implies that decisions made by small firms are highly influenced by 
the qualifications and skills of the manager director  
 
In sum, one of the key elements in the RIS in Asia is the provision of timely and 
qualified human capital to support the industries settled in the region.  For Asian 
SMEs, being located in a “human capital rich region” is definitively an advantage, as 
the qualification of the human capital is one of their main constraints to innovation 
and growth. But in order to benefit from the local conditions, Asian SMEs need to 
develop their absorptive capacity, creating an organization that nurtures innovation.  
 
3.2.2 Social capital and networks (soft infrastructure) in the Asian context 
 
The soft infrastructure varies significantly and is strongly dependent on the local 
culture (however heterogeneous and dynamics that might be measured in terms of 
value and subsequently behavioral regularities). Following the World Bank  
 
“Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the 
quality and quantity of a society's social interactions... Social capital is not just the 
sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them 
together”(World Bank 1998). 
 
Social capital refers both to “structural social capital” and “cognitive social capital” 
(World  Bank 2002). Structural social capital refers to “relatively objective and 
externally observable social structures, such as networks, associations, and 
institutions, and the rules and procedures they embody. Cognitive social capital 
comprises “more subjective and intangible elements such as generally accepted 
attitudes and norms of behavior, shared values, reciprocity, and trust
7.  Cognitive 
                                                 
7 “Although these two forms of social capital are mutually reinforcing, one can exist without the other. 
Government-mandated organizations represent structural social capital in which the cognitive element 
is not necessarily present. Similarly, many relations of mutual trust persist without being formalized in social capital can explain the raise of ethnical based networks of SMEs in Asian 
countries (of Indians, Chinese, etc) which provide the resources needed for the firm. 
 
Social capital consists of – at least – two dimensions: a) Trust, which can be divided 
into generalized trust and special trust, and the latter in turn into trust in the law 
enforcement system, trust in the political and administrative system, and local trust 
and b) cooperative ability, which is people's ability to work together (Paldam 2000). 
Moreover, it is crucial whether the trust is specific (constrained to one group) or 
generalized (to society as such). 
 
Social capital (and the related concept as trust) has implications for the interaction 
between agents/nodes in the RIS. Contrary to envisioned by standard economists 
economic interaction is not primarily a market-based exchange of (tangible) goods by 
anonymous agents regulated by a complete contract (in the context of efficient 
contract enforcement). On the contrary, exchange relies on incomplete contracts either 
due to the lack of possibilities for creating complete contracts, because of the 
disadvantages in terms of a low degree of flexibility build into complete contracts, or 
because of inefficient contract enforcement, depending on the mutual trust of the 
partners involved in the transaction.  
 
Unless there is a high degree of social capital cooperation, communication and thus 
mutual learning is limited. In short, absence of social capital in turn reduces the local 
firms prospects of getting access to important knowledge, knowledge sharing and 
interactive learning and hence from entering a virtues development circle.  
 
Social capital also underpins the development of a regional (or local) absorptive 
capacity. Through localized knowledge sharing and interactive learning knowledge 
can be disseminated locally/regionally and provide the crucial insight local firms need 
to move up the global value chain;  
 
Social capital is the main tie in many clusters of SMEs in Asia. For example, in the 
Karanggeneng tile cluster in Indonesia (Sandee and Rietveld 2001) most producers 
have several relatives involved in tile production. Producers can accept orders that 
exceed their production capacity trusting that some other (family related) producer in 
the cluster will complete the order. Social capital has also been the basis for trade 
credits between SMEs and suppliers in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, for example 
(World Bank 2002).   
 
As illustrated before, social capital is very important for SMEs as it can facilitate the 
access to the human, organizational and financial resources needed for innovation. For 
SMEs knowledge transfer mechanisms are informal and revolve around the 
transmission of tacit knowledge. This informality might provide the SME with a 
comparative advantage in terms of flexibility and speed of change, but it can also 
constrain the innovation potential of the firm, especially if the manager is not aware of 
the potential sources of innovation. In this sense, organizational issues in SMEs in 
developing countries seem to be very intertwined with the qualification of the owner. 
Thus leading to the relevance of training on managerial and organizational aspects of 
                                                                                                                                            
organizations. This description of social capital according to its forms has proven quite useful as a basis 
for empirical analysis” World Bank, 2002: 3. 
 the manager of the SME. The participation in formal and informal networks can in 
many cases facilitate the access to human and organizational skills necessary to 
upgrade in the innovation process.   
 
In summary, social capital constitutes one of the elements of the regional system of 
innovation that can support the emergence and development of clusters of SMEs, and 
their upgrading. Social ties might facilitate the access to the required hard and soft 
resources for innovation (machinery, capital, skills, knowledge etc) as well as 
provided the required flexibility to cope with fluctuations in the market in terms of 
quantity.   
 
3.2.3 Financial capital (hard infrastructure) in the Asian context 
 
 
Financial capital, especially foreign capital, is a scarce resource in Asian countries; 
especially after the financial crises in the late nineties. Moreover, even when those 
funds reach the productive systems, SMEs usually find great difficulties accessing 
them. Financial capital is crucial for investing in human capital and might even work 
as a useful mean when building up social capital.  For SMEs it is also the way to 
acquire more sophisticated technology (or in some cases simply introduce some 
machinery) in their production processes.   
 
In Asian countries risk willing capital that deliberately aims at upgrading industrial 
production is crucial and often a precondition for local firms getting the possibilities 
for experimenting with new products or process innovation, and subsequently of 
reducing their dependency on the TNCs, is a scarce resource. Moreover, when capital 
is scarce it is tempting to use the available capital for satisfying short term needs, thus 
not investing in innovative projects, competence building etc., which is needed for 
long term growth. 
 
Additionally, SMEs usually do not fulfill the requirements (in terms of assets) posed 
by the financial institutions to obtain a loan (hence, of rely on localized informal 
financial institutions). Social capital can facilitate the access to financial resources, as 
some examples in Asia show. When there is not a reliable infrastructure to provide 
SMEs with risk capital or when the SMEs do not fulfill the formal demands from the 
financial institutions, social networks might provide the access to micro-credits and 
loans. Lead firms in the cluster, suppliers or buyers can finance the acquisition of 
technology or even the training of the human resources.  
 
In summary, SMEs are bounded to their local conditions, in particular to their regional 
system of innovation and their cluster. When discussing the role of the RIS in Asian 
countries, and its impact on local SMEs it is important to take into account different 
forms of capital and their relationships: social capital, human and organizational 
capital, financial capital and physical infrastructure (infrastructure). Upgrading of 
SMEs in developing countries in general is possible when these four forms of capital 
are present and the SME can find in the local milieu (RIS) the resources needed to 
innovate.    
 
It is important to highlight the strong interaction and dynamism between the different 
forms of capital and the impact on SME development. A cluster of SMEs might be based in strong a very well functioning social ties. The most successful producers in 
the cluster might provide financial support to other producers for the acquisition of 
technology. Successful producers might even buy machinery that they rent out to 
other producers in the cluster, therefore facilitating the technology upgrading to a 
greater number of SMEs. The technological upgrading may attract the attention of 
international buyers and human capital, thus reinforcing the overall growth of the 
cluster. Far from being a hypothetical picture, this process can be observed in several 
clusters of SMEs in Asia and points out to the systemic character of the different 
elements of the regional innovation system. However there is not one single best case 
in upgrading clusters of SMEs but rather there seem to be important differences 
between industries, as we will discuss in next section.   
 
3.3. RIS’s industry specific dimension in the Asian context 
Since the acquisition and transformation of knowledge required for innovation and the 
learning processes differ significantly across industries the SMEs are involved in 
(Pavitt 1984,  Asheim, Coenen et al. 2003; Asheim and Gertler 2004,  Tunzelmann 
and Acha 2004) it is necessary to distinguish between different types of industries.  
According to Pietrobello and Rabellotti there is a need to differentiate between four 
categories of clustered SMEs: traditional manufacturing, resource-based industries, 
complex product systems and specialized suppliers. Some of the clustered SMEs rely 
on indigenous capabilities while others have to rely on exogenous sources, especially 
TNCs and – to a minor extent – members of transnational communities play an 
important role in this.  Moreover, the impact of the large firms on the indigenous 
SMEs varies significantly across cases. Sometimes, SMEs establish a cooperative 
agreement with the large firms, in which both groups are in even terms and share the 
technology, infrastructure, capital or knowledge available for the firms in the cluster. 
In other occasions, SMEs are acting only as subcontractors of large firms, and the 
transfer of knowledge is very limited. The role of the large firms in the local cluster 
will be discussed and illustrated in the cases.  
3.3.1. Traditional manufacturing  
Traditional manufacturing and natural resources-based industries are the most 
numerous in most Asian countries (Dhungana 2003) as table 2 shows.  Food and 
beverages and Textiles are the most important industries in terms of employment and 
added value in manufacturing at least in India, Indonesia, Philippines, China, Sri 
Lanka and Thailand. Only some of the most advanced economies of the region (Korea 
and Singapore) are not so dependent on these two industries.  The economic weight of 
the traditional manufacturing and natural-resources based industries in the area justify 
a deeper analysis of the innovation patterns in these two types of industries, mainly 
dominated by SMEs.   
--- Insert Table 2 around here ----- 
Technological innovation in traditional manufacturing industries is mainly process 
innovation often introduced by the suppliers of inputs. Firms innovate through the 
acquisition of technology, being the main suppliers the machinery and chemical 
industries. In those cases in which the SME acts as a subcontractor of a TNC, change 
might be driven by the demands on the lead firm, both in technological and non-technological terms (compliance with international quality standards, for example).  
Product innovation might also take place. In this case, innovations are usually of an 
incremental nature through the introduction of new product design or improvements 
in the quality of the product or the components.  
Competition in this industry is on costs, primarily labour costs. Clustering 
externalities involve the access to workers with specialized skills necessary for the 
industry, the linkages with specialized local supply of inputs and services, the 
dissemination of specialized know-how and information, shared machinery and 
infrastructure and, to a lesser extent, market access. Clustering of activities might also 
facilitate the adoption of more flexible forms of organisation, reducing the stock of 
products and transferring buying orders to competitors when they exceed the 
production capacity of the SME (Sandee and Rietveld 2001).   
 Information flows through informal channels facilitated by the local cohesion within 
the cluster as well as a result of the rotation of workers among the firms in the cluster.   
3.3.2. Natural resource-based  
Natural resource-based industries are very numerous in Asian countries. They 
comprise the industries based on natural resources, including agro-industrial activities. 
In the developing world one can find very good examples of upgrading of resource 
based clusters and their insertion in the global value chains
8. Most innovations and 
growth of these clusters are the result of the cooperation with scientific institutions. In 
this sense, the upgrading in this type of industries is dependent on the development 
and acquisition of scientific knowledge and its application to both product and 
processes.  
The linkages with basic and applied research institutions are crucial in the innovation 
of these industries. In most cases it is not about the creation of fundamentally new 
knowledge or new technology but to the adaptation of an existing technology already 
available in developing countries to the local conditions.   
 
Basic research is carried out by universities and in the research labs of large firms in 
the biotech, chemical and food firms, while SMEs are mostly responsible for the 
incremental improvements.   
 
Upgrading of SMEs in these clusters can be with or without the intervention of a large 
firm. In some cases, upgrading is the result of joint technology development and 
coordinated actions between firms, business associations, universities and other 
actors. In some others, TNC provide the technology and knowledge required for the 
upgrading of the local SMEs.   
3.3.3. Complex product systems (CoPS) 
SMEs in complex product systems are highly specialized firms anchored to a large 
assembler, which operates as the leading firm. Innovation in the network of CoPS is 
highly dependent on the strategy and the directions of the assembler.  As Pietrobelli 
                                                 
8 For example, the Chilean salmon cluster, the Orchid cluster in Taiwan, the apple cluster in Brazil, etc.  and Rabelotti (2004) argue, first tier suppliers which are owned by foreign companies, 
are the ones benefiting directly from the collaboration with the leading firm. They are 
technology intensive firms that design and produce subsystems and components for 
the assembler. Most SMEs operate as second and third tier, with very limited benefits 
(in terms of innovation) for their participation in the CoPS.   
Technological innovation is process innovation. As in traditional industries, local 
SMEs are usually required to compile with international quality standards in order to 
participate in the network.  Large assembler firms usually determine the scope of 
change of the local network of subcontractors.  
Externalities for geographical concentration are scarce, as both the leader firm and the 
assembler operate globally. Most knowledge needed in the production process is 
codified thus the need to interact with local suppliers is limited.  
3.3.4. Specialized suppliers 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2004) only consider software in this category. Innovation is 
market-driven and the interaction with the users is very intense. SMEs in this category 
tend to concentrate geographically to gain access to the labour market and the 
consumers. Formal joint cooperation between firms is limited.  
Technological innovation is fundamentally product innovation although upgrading is 
also the result of non-technological innovation such as joint marketing initiatives or 
changes in the organisation. The mobility of human resources among the different 
firms is an important channel for knowledge diffusion across the cluster and facilitates 
the dissemination and adoption of non-technological innovations.  
 
4. Empirical cases 
 
This section turns to the fours cases representing the different types of industries. The 
cases are just minor illustrations only and their complexity cannot be dealt with in its 
totality. The cases serve to illustrate the need for industry specific policies. 
  
  
4.1. Traditional industry – The Jepara furniture cluster (Java, Indonesia) 
 
Indonesia has a very long tradition of clusters of SMEs around similar activities. Craft 
industries are usually geographically concentrated, emulating ancient guilds. This is 
also the case of the furniture cluster in Jepara.  
 
The Jepara furniture cluster in Java Indonesia is a large cluster. In the mid nineties the 
cluster comprised more than 2000 small enterprises and 100 large and medium ones 
and employing over 40,000 permanent workers (Sandee et al. 1998). Firms are 
dispersed across 80 villages in the Jepara region. About 70 percent of the production 
goes to international markets, and the rest to domestic markets. Domestic firms 
account for 75% of the exports while foreign firms are only responsible for 25 per 
cent (Berry et al 2002).   
 Often members of the same large family own different SMEs in the cluster. Social and 
family ties are very strong and, as we shall discuss, explain the success in collective 
strategy. 
 
Regional autonomy in the Jepara cluster (RIS) 
 
The geographical fragmentation of Indonesia in multiple islands with different history and 
ethnic roots has traditionally favored a great regional autonomy. National policy is very 
limited and regional governments are the ones designing and implementing the different 
policies in the region. This is why, as argued by many authors, it is almost impossible to 
talk about a national innovation system, but an array of regional innovation systems at 
most.  
 
Strategies behind SMEs upgrading in the cluster 
 
Traditionally SMEs in the cluster have focused on the domestic market, where quality 
standards were low and requirements in terms of design were often not fitting the taste 
of the international customer.  The situation changed in the mid eighties, when the 
government sponsored the participation of Java furniture producers in an international 
fair in Bali. As a consequence, international buyers started to show interest in the 
local production.  
 
Since then, the cluster has been dominated by large international buyers (IKEA is one 
example of them) who ”translate” the demands of the final international customer to 
the local producers. The indigenous SMEs have followed two types of strategies to 
access the global market (Loebis and Schmitz 2005): although the majority of 
producers opted to reduce costs (low salaries, illegal raw materials, avoid taxes), few 
furniture makers opted to compete by upgrading processes and products. The later 
strategy has implied the introduction of new managerial and organizational changes, 
including the compliance with international quality and environmental standards. 
These indigenous SMEs and large firms have privileged access to information and 




For those SMEs that have not strong ties with international buyers, knowledge 
creation is basically through apprenticeship and learning by doing in general.  
 
There is a limited number of very skilled craftsmen, who are employed by joint 
ventures of SMEs or larger foreign firms (Sandee et al. 1998).   
 
Most SMEs are family based. The father of the family is usually the owner and 
manager. His knowledge is often limited to technical knowledge about furniture 
crafting; managerial and marketing skills are often lacking, which seriously limits the 
absorptive capacity of the firm.  
 
In some cases, the employment of expatriates has been a mechanism to acquire 
technological capability in the rattan firms. Foreign immigrants have better access to 
market, technology and financing sources (Supratikno 2002 cf Tambunan 2005).   
Knowledge on customer tastes, technology and access to financial resources might be transferred through social ties. Usually the different members of the family of 
expatriates are the first one accessing this knowledge.  
 
Social capital and networks 
 
Joint action among producers is well developed. Social capital is strong and based on 
family relations and historical cooperation between families. Small firms participate 
in networks that share workers, equipment and market channels (Burger et al 2001: 
297). These networks of SMEs are usually linked to a large firm or trader that acts as 
a broker between the group of SMEs and the large international buyers. These later 
form of relation is too weak and indirect to sustain learning by interaction. 
 
When SMEs collaborate with large firms is usually as subcontractors, although there 
are some cases of joint-ventures between a local firm and a foreign enterprise. 
Subcontracting has been crucial to harness traditional skills for export production. 
Subcontracting is often based on social capital and as identified by Berry et al (2002) 
often based on kinship, friendship or former business contacts.  Many of the local 
producers belong to extended families with a long history of cooperation.    
 
The furniture industry is customer driven. User-producer interaction is a very 
important source of innovation. However, many firms in the cluster do not have direct 
access to their customers. Large firms in the cluster benefit from information received 
from the international buyers, with whom they relate directly. SMEs, on the other 
hand, usually do not have access to the international buyer directly but through traders 
that connect many small firms with international buyers. Their access to information 
on new designs, new technologies, etc is very limited. They main mode of learning is 
learning by doing and due to the close interaction some imitating also exists (Loebis 
and Schmitz, 2005), hence new techniques and designs spill over locally.   
 
Collaboration with suppliers, private consultants and industry associations were not 




Financial capital is scarce. The region does not provide the financial support that most 
SMEs would need to upgrade their skills (managerial, marketing) and technology.  
Once again, social networks have provided SMEs with access to financial capital. 
SMEs might get financial support from other SMEs in the network (family members 
that have been more successful).  
 
The cluster has recently benefited from direct investments made by foreign 
immigrants (Supratikno 2002 cf Tambunan 2005).  Additionally, few SMEs 
participating in joint ventures with foreign firms might have also received financial 




The role of the regional and local government in the provision of hard and soft 
infrastructure for the cluster has been significant. The local government has been 
responsible for several infrastructure projects, including the improvement of the harbor to facilitate international shipping of the orders, container facilities, roads and 
telephones (Tambunan 2005).  Without these infrastructure improvements the 
internationalization of the cluster would have been severely constrained.  
 
Technical and management training is provided by a specific academy created with 
the support of the regional government. Additionally, the government sponsored the 
participation of local furniture makers in international trade exports, which facilitated 
the access to international buyers and markets for Small and medium size enterprises 
(Berry et al 2001).  
 
However, sustaining the advantage of the cluster as an international furniture provider 
will only be possible if some additional measures are taken:  
 
In terms of the soft infrastructure, the cluster provides strong social capital. However, 
not all these social networks lead to the development of SMEs as not all of them 
involve the exchange of information on markets, technology or skills.  The local 
government could support collective actions that involve the most advanced SMEs in 
the clusters, notably those managed by expatriates that have access to international 
markets, technology and finance.  
 
Qualified human capital is scarce and only available to a number of SMEs that have 
joint access to the skilled labor and large firms. Knowledge is in most cases limited to 
technical (craft) knowledge, with a clear lack of managerial, design and marketing 
skills. The consequence is the limited absorptive capacity of the firms in the cluster. 
The government can contribute to the development of the SMEs by providing or 
supporting the development of business development services such as training, 
testing, supply chain management and certification. Training targeted to soft elements 
of the innovation processes, usually marketing or managerial skills or organizational 
change is clearly needed.  The strength of the local networks can facilitate the 
dissemination of successful managerial practices. 
 
SMEs are keener to listen to buyers than to local government, but the Government can 
facilitate and encourage the participation of indigenous SMEs in international 
markets, as it has done in the past.  
 
Finally, the government has a role to play in ensuring the access to sustainable raw 
material and preventing the use of illegal (and cheaper) raw material in the cluster.  
Upgrading the environmental standards of the cluster as well as the quality standards 
of the production is also needed. 
 
 
4.2. The Floral industry in Taiwan  
 
Taiwan floral industry has experienced a fast growth over the last decade due to a 
strong domestic market and the increases in cut flower exports, especially to Japan 
and the US (Tsai 2001).  Today Taiwan competes in international markets in the same 
segment with Thailand or China.  
 
The sector is clearly dominated by SMEs. Traditionally, there has been a clear 
division of labor between the production and commercialization of flowers. Producers are small in size (usually the average farm size per family is one hectare) due to the 
high cost of the land. Producer SMEs tend to cluster geographically to be able to 
access to machinery and greenhouse facilities shared by different producers (Tsai 
2001). The knowledge required for the production is very specific and operational and 
most producers do not have any marketing skills.  
 
Regional autonomy in the Taiwanese floral industry 
 
As a province of China formally speaking, and taking into account their limited territory 
Taiwan can be considered to be in itself a region with complete de facto political autonomy 
from mainland China. The producers are dispersed around the island. The Taiwanese 
government has settled the priorities for the economic development of the island, being 
one of them the biotech sector and its connections with other local industries including the 
floral industry. 
 
The government of Taiwan is playing a major role in the development of the flower 
industry in Taiwan, specially the orchid production. As an example, the national 
government in cooperation with the local government of Tainan County decided to create 
an Orchid biotechnology park that is currently under development. The purpose is to turn a 
former sugar cane production area into a world class orchid production area.  
 
Strategies behind SMEs upgrading in the cluster 
 
The technological upgrading of the flower industry in Taiwan, especially the orchid 
production is clearly linked to the investments in biotechnology and the linkages with the 
knowledge providers of the regional innovation system (universities and research centers). 
Until very recently the Taiwanese producers relied only on ‘natural’ species which could 
be produced on most Asian countries, hence not a source of long term competitiveness. 
Now they are experimenting with non-natural varieties which display particular aesthetic 
features and longer durability. These are the outcome of an emerging collaboration 
between producers and the bio institutes. This collaboration has provided and provides 
opportunities for developing new species. (E.g. like the blue orchid). Realizing the full 
potential of this collaboration is however s contingent to establishing the right links 
between the producers, the researchers and the final markets (through the marketing 
channels). Currently collective action is frequent but limited to one activity of the value 
chain (production or marketing) and hence appears fragmented. Orchids are rather easily 
copied (imitated) but since Taiwan has and is developing specialized knowledge and 
related support institutions within these fields Taiwan can engage in a constant upgrading 
and protect themselves against imitators and hence sustain their long term competitiveness. 
SMEs are responsible for the production and, to some extent for the marketing of the 
product.  Most of the activities are based on indigenous Taiwanese firms and TNCs have a 




In terms of human capital Taiwan government has made a considerable effort 
increasing the number of students in secondary and tertiary education (Veselka 2005). 
In 2000 the percentage of the population with higher education was 88, 5 %. General 
competences are crucial for the upgrading process which places high demands for 
general skills on the producers.   
In the Taiwanese flower cluster there is a great component of formal training and, 
although it has not been documented, we expect that there is also a great flow of 
information between the farmers about production techniques and intense learning by 
doing.  The Taiwanese Council of Agriculture supports different training program in 
agricultural product marketing targeted specially to young farmers (Taiwan Council 
of Agriculture, 2003).   
 
However, the upgrading strategy chosen in the cluster (via biotech developments) 
requires a great absorptive capacity by the indigenous SMEs. Not only they need to 
know their product and how to optimize the production, but need to have some 
minimal technical knowledge to be able to interact with the researchers in the 
biotechnology firms.   
 
Social capital and networks 
 
Taiwan economy has been traditionally dominated by SMEs. Small businesses form 
tight networks encompassing personal and business relationships. These networks 
guanxi are based on traditional Chinese social values where human relationships are 
closely linked to families, relatives, friends, classmates, and previous colleagues (Liu, 
1998) but segmented along ‘ethnical’ lines (e.g.Hakka, Mainlander and Taiwanese). 
 
The distribution of flowers to the domestic and international markets is in the hands of 
cooperatives and cooperative marketing teams who also set the quality standards that 
the farmers should follow (Hsieh 2001). The marketing channel is dominated by four 
wholesale companies that use the auction system providing on real time the 
information on the market on line.  Most SMEs produce for the local market and only 
10-20 percent of the production goes to external markets. This focus on the local 
market can partly been explained by the appreciation of the NT dollar that destroyed 
the price advantage that Taiwanese firms had (Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2004) 
 
The majority of producers do not have any interaction with the final customer. Most 
innovations are technology driven (and not customer driven) and relate to better seeds 
and new varieties of plants (product innovation) or more efficient forms of cultivating 




The government has played an important role in the provision of financial support for 
indigenous SMEs as they could not finance research activities  nor did the Taiwanese 
producers initially considering investing in these areas as they did not realize the 
potential. Additionally to financing the research and development the financial 
support has been mainly in the form of loans at preferential rates for the construction 
of greenhouse facilities explicitly targeting groups of SMEs. However, the regional 
innovation system seems to be weak in the provision of funds for other purposes (such 
as upgrading of skills, participation in international trade fairs, etc). That is, the 
amount of financial capital committed by the government for the upgrading of the 






The technological upgrading of the flower industry in Taiwan, especially the orchid 
production is clearly linked to the investments in biotechnology. The government 
support has been decisive in the technological upgrading of the sector, being the main 
instrument of the innovation policy the creation of Science and Industry parks (Tsai 
and Wang 2002). One of the most recent initiatives has been the creation of an Orchid 
Biotechnology Park in Tainan County (Taiwan Council of Agriculture 2003). The 
government is financing the construction of an exposition hall, a genetic laboratory, 
quarantine site, shipping and packing areas and the improvement of the existing road 
and water infrastructure (Bradsher 2004). As mentioned before, the government is 
also providing the farmers with access to subsidized loans to build approximately 200 
greenhouse facilities. The objective of the program is to turn the Taiwanese orchid 
industry into a world leader and to gradually substitute low added value agricultural 
activities in the area, such as sugar cane production.  
 
However, the government has focus largely on the provision of hard infrastructure for 
the sector and not much on the soft infrastructure. Although most producers seem to 
have the required technical skills, they lack managerial and marketing skills. Their 
information on the market is very limited, and their access to new techniques 
contingent to the formal linkages with biotechnology firms.  
 
In the past, the linkages between producers and researchers have been one of the 
Achilles heel of similar initiatives.  The Taiwanese government has a great role to 
play facilitating the interaction between these two collectives of firms, as well as 
linking them to the firms commercializing the final product. That is, there is a need to 
invest as well in soft infrastructure in the cluster, developing both the networks and 
the absorptive capacity of local SMEs. The provision of business services such as 
technical and managerial training, information, etc. could be a good instrument to 
support this process.   
 
Thailand’s Automobile clusters – suggestions for RIS policies 
 
The Thai automobile industry – occasionally referred to as the Detroit of Asia – is 
considered to be the most important hub for automotive production in Asian 
(Techakanont and Takahashi 2004, Lecler 2002) and has until recently – at least – 
been considered a success case; why will be come clear below.  
 
The automobile industry is the paradigmatic case of complex production systems 
(Pietrobelli and Rabelotti 2002). The Thai automobile industry is constituted by 
several clusters. Initially the production was located in a cluster located close to 
Bangkok. Diseconomies of agglomeration (ranging from increased wages, scarcity of 
workers to traffic congestion) have resulted in the emergence of new clusters scattered 
around Thailand where Chonburi, Bangkok, Rayong, Samutprakarn and Pathumthani 
are among the most important ones (for details on the differences in their internal 
specialization, see Samat 2004). The Thai clusters are centred on TNCs. Most major 
assemblers are present in Thailand (from Japan: Toyota, Honda, Isuzu, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Hino; US: GM, Chrysler, Ford; Europe: BMW, Volvo, Daimler, 
Volkswagen, Citron, and Peugeot). 
 
Around 113,512 are employed in the Industry where SME accounts for approximately 
50% percent of the employees (Samat 2004). The indigenous Thai firms are mainly 
SMEs and mainly second and third tier subcontractors. The first tier consists of more 
than 700 companies where 40% of these are owned by TNCs and where fully Thai-
owned companies constitute a 50% but where the value of the Thai tiers constitutes 
only 10 percent. Second tier suppliers are around 1000 (Samat 2004).   
 
Regional Autonomy in Thailand’s automobile cluster 
 
The Thai innovation system is highly centralized when it comes to automotive 
industry. Policy-making, budget allocation is centralized in Thailand. Regions do not 
hold any important decision making powers.  Nor do the regions yet hold noteworthy 
competences or capacities for public intervention although the last years the central 
government has allocated more money for the regional government bodies;  
 
Strategies behind SMEs upgrading in the clusters – Building on the TNCs 
 
The clusters are clearly dominated by TNC who control and define the scope of the 
innovation in the sector.  The role of the SMEs in the clusters has been significantly 
affected by the national policy which changed significantly after the WTO/GATT 
agreement. Until recently the Thai SMEs played a significant role as first or second 
tier subcontractors for the TNCs. Formal policies from the Thai central government 
stipulated that TNCs locating in Thailand had to guarantee a certain local content in 
the production. TNC were obliged to link up with local manufacturers.  However, in 
the last years have the Thai SMEs have either been reduced to third or forth tier 
subcontractors, been bought up or gone bankrupt.
9 This can be attributed to the 
general ‘deregulation’ enforced by WTO/GATT. The Thai government interpreted the 
WTO/GATT agreement as entailing the dismantlement of the “local content 
requirement” and a general opening of the economy to FDI. As a result TNC 
subsidiaries established production in the Thai clusters and out competed the Thai 
SMEs. Moreover, new strategies among the major assemblers on product innovations 
place a new demand on the local subcontractors. The assemblers have started to 
develop local models. To attain this goal the SMEs have to become involved in the 
design process to.  
In this context, it is possible to distinguish between two types of SMEs and upgrading 
opportunities: Foreign and joint-venture firms seem to have preferential access to the 
required technology and resources through their parent companies. Unfortunately, this 
is only a minority in the cluster. For the vast majority of SMEs in the sector, 
technological improvement is only the result of in-house efforts and the improved 
experience of employees (Techakanonta and T. Terdudomtham, 2004). Human and 
organizational capitals are the main determinants of the upgrading of these SMEs. 
Most SMEs do not comply with the international quality standards required by the 
TNC assemblers to be first-tiers.  
                                                 
9 While the bankruptcy sure was accelerated by the late nineties financial crisis in Asia; this cannot hide 
the fundamental structural problems the Thai automotive industry faced. Thai firms cannot always be price competitive. If they want to compete Thai firms 
need to enhance their engineering capabilities, develop design competencies and 
move up in the value chain. The Thai SMEs have not managed this transformation. 
Why?     
 
Human capital  
Thai firms did not use the advantage that they enjoy during the “local content 
requirement” period to develop their competencies or implement organizational forms 
supporting product or process innovations. Thai SMEs simply produced parts 
according to already established production methods, blueprints and – often – based 
on technology acquired from the TNC (Techakanont and Takahashi, 2004). Due to the 
lack of competition (and lack of opportunities because of the global strategies on 
which the assemblers relied) the Thai SMEs were not stimulated to invest in their 
human capital and technological upgrading, nor did their profit margins allow for 
huge investments in human capital building. The central Thai government did not 
develop or implement competitiveness oriented policies (the link to decentralization 
will be elaborated upon below).  As a result, most Thai SMEs lack the human capital 
and organisational ability required to engage in innovation (and upgrading in the 
global value chain), that is, they lack the required absorptive capacity to acquire 
technology and knowledge generated elsewhere. In the short run the Thai SMEs need 
to engage in ‘continuous’ improvements within three areas: quality improvements, 
cost reductions and more secure delivery times’ (Techakanont and Takahashi, 2004). 
In the long run there is a need for a developing the technological (engineering) 
capabilities based on external technology transfer from TNCs as indigenous 
technologies are almost none existing
10; additionally there is a need for building 
competencies within design and testing (Techakanont and Takahashi, 2004).  
Social capital in Thai automobile clusters 
 
Compared to other types of clusters where horizontal knowledge spillovers are 
considered crucial this is not the case for the Thai automobile clusters. Networks are 
limited to first tier suppliers
11. Second third-tier suppliers do not connect to the 
network as they do not meet the quality standards (Sevilla and Soonthornthada, 2000). 
As an example, only 10 % of the Thai suppliers have ISO 9000, 14000 or 18000. That 
is, collaboration based on social capital between Thai SMEs is not yet of much 
relevancy as most Thai SMEs simply do not have the competencies, knowledge and 
information that can create synergetic relationships.  
As the situation is now the Thai have to rely on technology transfer from TNCs. This 
however is a challenging strategy with few successes (Asheim and Vang, 
forthcoming, Narula and Marin 2005, Lall and Narula 2004). Only few SMEs receive 
advice about quality control, maintenance, design drawings for the making of dies or 
tooling and advice about project management from the assemblers (Techakanonta and 
Terdudomtham, 2004) 
 
                                                 
10 Unless the Thai government uses RIS policies to develop indigenous capabilities, see below.   
11 For example one of the consequences of the Japanese leadership was to create several Automobile 




Introducing the quality standards is a costly process. Only SMEs in the first tier might 
benefit from some support from the TNC. As demonstrated by Ramachandran (1993) 
and Technakanont (2003) the TNCs spend ‘ … more resources for technology transfer 
to wholly owned subsidiaries that to joint ventures, while they expended the smallest 
quantity of resources on the independent local firms (Technakanont 2003). In other 
words the Thai SMEs cannot expect much support from TNCs; and certainly not 
before a minimum human and organisational capital level is reached.  
 
But most of the SMEs need to rely on the regional and sectoral infrastructure for the 
provision of sources of funding. In this sense, The Thai Automotive Institute 
(Ministry of Industry) has a scheme for supporting supplier development directed 
primarily toward SMEs. The scheme provides funding for group consulting, although 
some individual support is also available (Turpin et al. 2002).  
 
 
Policies – from cluster to sector specific SME RIS policies 
 
The current situation of Thai indigenous SMEs in the automotive clusters is 
precarious and there is room for improvement in the local soft and hard RIS 
infrastructure. In terms of the human capital there is a need to investment in sector 
specific training. Given the current competencies of regional government bodies the 
central government should maintain control over general training and competency 
building; the need for localized knowledge is of minor importance in these cases 
within a global industry like the automobile industry.  
There is a need for establishing links between the best technical colleges and 
universities and the Thai SMEs in order to develop the indigenous technologies which 
the Thai firms cannot access from the assemblers (and other TNCs).  Unless these are 
developed it is difficult to imagine the Thai SMEs moving up the value chain (again). 
But is seems logical to link this government initiatives with existing ones sponsored 
by some assemblers (avoiding reinventing the wheel). For example, Toyota has a 
special vocational education school in Thailand and  Chulalongkorn University’s 
Faculty of Engineering has a Bachelor degree program on Automotive engineering 
with collaboration of Toyota. Alliances with this type of educational institutions to 
provide training to a wider array of Thai SMEs would be desirable. Of more mundane 
tasks there is a need for zooming in on training focusing on ‘ … mold and dies, 
casting, tooling and design technology such as CAD/CAM/CAE (Techakanont and 
Takahashi 2004, p. 23). Supplementary to this firms need to transform their 
organization so the can accommodate innovations; this includes allowing time for 
participation in training, minor development projects, and so forth.  
The centralized government bodies including the technical colleges and universities 
need to build organizations physically present in the clusters as this is where the 
SMEs are located. This will allow the central government bodies to develop the 
needed local knowledge (local knowledge is needed despite the global standards due 
to different degrees of specialization, institutional structure, and so forth). Moreover, these government bodies need to be equipped with a sufficient high degree of 
autonomy that allows them to act on the basis of local knowledge. The combination of 
centralization and decentralization will allow for harvesting some economies of scale 
in the development of indigenous technologies. In a slightly longer time perspective 
the decentralized structure might provide a foundation that will allow for more social 
capital based horizontal collaboration which might become relevant when the 
investments in human and organisational capital is ‘in place’ and a indigenous 
technologies developed. Increasing the absorptive capacity of the firms will set the 
foundations for the introduction of quality standards in the SMEs which, in turn, will 
improve the possibilities for recuperating their position in the first tier.  
 
Bangalore IT cluster 
 
Situated 1000 km from Bombay, in the Karnataka State, Bangalore has become one of the 
most important IT clusters outside the US to the extent that it is known as “India’s Silicon 
Valley” (Nadvi, 1995). Bangalore city, with around 1 million inhabitants, is the center of 
the city-region spread out around Bangalore.  
 
Bangalore houses several high-tech clusters (defense, aeronautics and IT) and is 
considered to be the scientific and engineering centre of India in terms of research, training 
and manufacturing. India’s best research university- Indian Institute of Science is based in 
Bangalore. The easy access to qualified and relatively cheap technical human capital 
attracted a number of transnational corporations during the nineties. Large firms such as 
IBM, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, Siemens, 3M, Texas, etc. located in the area.   
 
Despite the weight of the TNC in the Bangalore IT sector, the large majority of firms are 
small and medium sized enterprises. Only 10-15 percent of the revenues of the sector are 
from SMEs (NASSCOM, 2005).   
 
 Regional autonomy in Bangalore IT cluster 
 
The development of this particular city-region is more shaped by the industrial 
development in the US than local cluster-effects and regional government bodies’ policies. 
Though it should be stressed that Bangalore's growth until the late 1980s (when the 
software export boom began) relied on local (largely public sector) investments; it should 
also be noted that Bangalore had a privileged position in comparison with other Indian 
regions. Bangalore already had a dense organizational setting; Bangalore was/is the center 
for advanced science and military research – this was mainly for physical geographical 
reasons such as air without dust which was needed for military testing - and had a number 
of good educational institutions already, mainly paid for by the central authorities. Even 
the government did locate in Bangalore the public telephone company as well as other 
large state enterprises in high-tech sectors.  
 
The state apart from providing basic sound macro-economical policies and similar did not 
do much to enhance the development of an IT industry in India, subsequently Bangalore 
(Parthasarathy 2004). Nor did they have noticeable regional policies concerning the 
development of the IT industry. The crucial difference between India and other developing 
countries was a rather highly developed human capital infrastructure. The Indian state has 
developed IT colleges of a high quality and many Indians considered them attractive.  
  
 
Strategy for SME upgrading in the cluster 
 
As in the Thai Automotive cluster, the dynamics of the IT cluster in Bangalore are 
dominated by the large transnational corporations located there. It is possible to find 
two types of SMEs: those tied to a TNC through a subcontracting agreement and a 
limited number of independent SMEs.  
 
Frequently, SMEs undertake task specific job-work for the large client firm who 
settles the parameters of the production and the final outcome and tightly controls the 
performance of the SME. For these SMEs, which are the majority, innovation is 
defined by the large firms and SMEs are only responsible for maintaining quality 
standards at minimum costs. Innovation is mostly determined by the large firms 
(Nadvi, 1995, Vang and Overby, forthcoming)). Occasionally the SMEs suggest 
marginal modifications to the large firm, based on their expertise.  
 
Beside this large group of SMEs and networks, it is possible to find some independent 
SMEs, usually driven by highly qualified people that decided to run their own firm. 
These firms retain their own design and production capacity and try to position their 
products in the local market and to a lesser extent, abroad. Innovation is the result of 
the interaction with the final clients.  
 
Human capital  
 
The technical side of the knowledge base of the IT industry draws on a combination 
of technical – engineering -skills. The routine activities basically draw on codified 
programming skills while the sophisticated tasks draw on a combination of codified 
programming competencies, firm specific – tacit and quasi-codified - competencies 
developed through creating customized programs.   
 
Accessing qualified workers is not a problem for the SMEs of this cluster and, in this 
sense, their capacity to absorb knowledge and technology generated outside the SME 
(absorptive capacity) is very high. There are several universities, business schools and 
high schools located in the region that provide the cluster with the required supply of 
skill labor.  
 
Several studies have documented that during the first phase US-firms mainly 
outsourced routine IT-services such as maintenance of existing code or reengineering 
code from one programming language to another to India. The human capital base in 
Bangalore was characterized by many well-educated engineers that were perfectly 
capable of undertaking these activities. The skills needed for this were simple IT skills 
and the Indians undertaking these activities were most often over-qualified. 
 
In recent years Indian firms have to some extent been capable of moving up the global 
value chain. On the one hand, TNCs adopted a deliberate strategy to modularize and 
standardize some of their IT processes. This provides the background for the distance 
work which in turn allowed the Indian firms to maintain a broader knowledge base at 
home ((Parthasarathy, 2004), hence secure better absorptive capacity.  
 Social capital and networks 
 
Collaboration between SMEs based on social networks is limited in the IT cluster, but 
it exists. Interpersonal networks are based on common schooling and alumni links 
built around the many technical schools located in the region (Nadvi 1995) as well as 
on previous working relationships (people that have been working together in the 
same firm one time or another).   
 
Consortia of SMEs have often been prone to failure due to the competitive tendencies 
among group members. Evidence suggests that they have been more effective when 
member firms are complementing each other and not competing. Joint action has 
often involved marketing of products and seldom the development of a product 
(Nadvi 1995).  
 
Social capital transcends the regional boundaries in this cluster. The social capital of 
the Indian transnational community played a crucial role in establishing the IT 
industry. To get access to orders, capital and more sophisticated knowledge the Indian 
firms were forced to target transnational corporations. This uncertainty allowed the 
Indian transnational community, who held important positions in the US firms, to play 
a significant role in shaping the outsourcing decisions in the US firms 
 
Recently one has witnessed a significant growth in interaction between Bangalore 
firms and US and European firms as well as a diversification of the profiles of firms 
investing in Bangalore. The Bangalore firms have developed a certain degree of 
autonomy from the lead firms in US and Europe. The autonomy is a function of 
investments in human capital and new managerial strategies; hence they can now 
provide all types of services from the highest end of the value chain to the bottom end. 
This has allowed them to move up the global value chain. Part of this process has 
been facilitated by increased cluster-effect and spin offs from the different universities 
located in Bangalore. However, the Indian firms did only to a limited extent engage in 
interactive learning compared to more bustling IT cluster such as Silicon Valley. 
While the social capital was efficiently in creating the initial development phase it has 
proven less efficient in stimulating collaboration between different Indian firms; 
especially Indian firms outside the boundaries of the networks (i.e. not an inclusive 
social capital structure) 
 
Financial capital and other hard infrastructure 
 
Although the national government has made significant efforts in establishing a 
venture-capital community in India, the results have been puzzling. The development 
of venture capital in India can be divided into two periods: 1986-95 and 1995-
currently (Avnimelech and Teubal 2002). During the first period, the first Guidelines 
for the emergence of venture capital firms were approved. The Indian government 
with the support of the World Bank financed the creation of four venture capital 
companies (VC), subsidiaries of state-controlled banks. One of the, the TDCI was 
located in Bangalore. The results of this first phase were weak. Some of the reasons 
adduced to the failure were the high bureaucracy and the state control of the VC.  
During the second period, the market was open to private VC. The first foreign owned 
CV firm established in the nineties as well as the first 100% privately owned CV. 
During this second phase, non-resident Indians (members of the transnational community) have become significant investors.  Nevertheless the VC infrastructure 
remains weak, highly bureaucratized and overruled.  
 
Particularly in the cluster, TNC are an important source of financial capital for some 
SMEs as well as non-resident Indians. Social capital might facilitate the access to this 
later source of funding, exploiting family or kinship ties with Indians residing abroad.  
 
Policies – from cluster to sector specific SME RIS policies 
 
The high human capital profile combined with lack of inclusive social capital calls for 
intervention by the regional authorities with the aim of stimulating collaborative 
projects for SMEs. The regional state however has not done enough to spur a new 
development model based on local interaction and public procurements.  
 
Government support is actively needed as salaries in this period have grown up to 40 
percent eroding the cost advantage for the Bangalore SME. Thus the competitive 
advantage of Bangalore (or the Bangalore model) is diminishing and there is a need 
for RIS based policies such as strategic procurement from the state or regional 
authorities; these polices should stress the regional collaboration dimension with the 
aim of bringing the Indian firms closer together. The policies should also be focusing 
on innovations and hence help to overcome the obstacles the lack of a sophisticated 
national demand places on the Indian firms. This collective approach could be use to 
market the IT SMEs in international markets.  
 
The individual firms do have the technical skills (human capital) to take advantage of 
a more local cooperation and apart from some limitations in the general level of 
management the absorptive capacity is highly developed.  
 
Additionally, in this fast growing sector, there is a clear need to improve the financial 
infrastructure. As discussed previously, although there is a VC market, SMEs in the 
sector might find serious constraints accessing the funds due to the excessive 
bureaucracy. Accessing funds timely is as important as accessing funds at all in this 
fast growing sector.  
 
 
5. Innovation Policy for SMEs – learning from the cases  
 
 
This section aims at drawing lessons for the design and implementation of innovation 
policies to support Asian SMEs in a regional innovation systems perspective. The 
lessons are based on the cases; hence we do not suggest they can be automatically 
applied to other clusters and regional innovation systems. Instead the serve purpose of 
illustrating the need for diversity of innovation policies supporting SMEs. We 
critically use the RIS framework to discuss how the hard and soft infrastructure of the 
RIS and their systemic propensities might influence the innovative performance of the 
Asian SMEs located in the region; and how can the government selectively invest in 
the weak and critical nodes of the infrastructure to support SMEs innovative 
capabilities and upgrading in general.  
 Innovation policies usually follow best practice models based on high-tech clusters 
located in high performing regions and only a small number of SMEs benefit from 
these policy measures. In this paper we argue that when designing innovation policy 
for SMEs, policy makers need to take into account the different dynamics of regions 
and clusters of SMEs. In the current paper, we have discussed innovation patterns in 
four clusters of SMEs in Asia in relation to the hard and soft infrastructure of the 
regional system of innovation in which each cluster is operating. The four clusters 
represent the four most common industries in the region: traditional industry, 
resource-based industry, complex product systems industry and specialized software. 
The cases illustrate how traditional industries or resource-based industries that tend to 
be ignored by innovation (technology) policies in Asia, have significant potential in 
terms of innovation. Hence, these cases illustrate that traditional industries remain 
potential platforms for upgrading in developing countries (Mylteka and Farinelli 
2000) but also that policy makers need to adopt a broader perspective on the 
innovation processes in these industries. Hence, one of the first conclusions to draw 
from the cases is that there is a need for innovation policies targeting the particular 
needs of SMEs operating in different industries. Unless such measures are taken 
SMEs are not likely to engage in noteworthy innovations or upgrading in general. 
Subsequently, the SMEs will at best maintain their role as low cost subcontractors to 
TNC and not exploit their economic potential. In the worst scenario they could even 
lose their position as subcontractors by being out competed by world players.  
 
The cases also suggest that designing and implementing innovative policies for Asian 
SMEs requires an approach that pays attention to a) the territorial decision structure 
and b). The specific combination of hard and soft infrastructure that constitutes the 
appropriate support for Asian innovative SMEs.  
 
Decentralized decision-making structure 
 
Applying the regional innovation system approach has proven useful as the point of 
departure for the design of innovation policies to support SMEs in Asian countries. In 
contrast to other more atomistic approaches working with the same variables but in 
isolation, the systemic approach considers the links and dependencies of the different 
institutions and organizations that constitute the innovation system. Thinking 
“systemic” allows selective interventions in the weakest nodes in the system and/or on 
the most critical nodes. And selectivity is crucial for developing countries where 
financial resources are extremely scarce. The systemic approach facilitates the 
identification of dependencies and complementarities between variables. This in turn 
can help policy makers to avoid policy interventions focusing on just one variable of 
the system which might lead to decreasing returns unless supported by 
complementary investments. As an example, additional investment in human capital 
in the Bangalore region will not pay off of unless combined by demand side 
investments.    
 
The cases tend to hold the general claim in the RIS and cluster-literature arguing in 
favor of decentralized decision-making structures. This is supported by the behavioral 
pattern of the Asian SMEs whose interactions tend to be embedded locally. Highly 
centralized government bodies tend to lack the local knowledge and base their 
interventions on aggregated data that often fails to capture both local and industry 
specificities. Thus the particular needs of the local SMEs, morphology of local networks and so forth are ignored. For these reasons, centralized governments might 
even intervene in counterproductive ways. As mentioned earlier, this calls for a 
decentralized decision-making structure. However, there is a need to a) highlight the 
still relevant role of the centralized government agencies and b) a need to argue 
against a ‘one-fits all’ territorial decision-making structure.  
 
Across industries the centralized government bodies continue to play a crucial role in 
generating general polices of relevancy for the SMEs innovative performance. The 
importance of replacing the ISI-strategy with an EOS-strategy in the Indian case is 
almost paradigmatic for illustrating this. Equally, important is that the centralized 
governmental bodies need to define the general formal rules of the game (e.g. formal 
law, working standards) to avoid that regions use national policies to engage in a cost-
based competition against each other. Decentralization of such policies is likely to 
hamper the innovation performance of SMEs. 
 
The morphology of the decentralized decision-making structure is also contingent on 
the industry and institutional setting as the cases illustrate. It can take two forms: a) all 
major decision rights can (or should be) be allocated to the regional governments or b) 
central government bodies have (or should have) located local government branches 
with a high degree of autonomy in the relevant regions and clusters. In the latter case 
there is an additional need to pay attention to which part of the policy process needs to 
be decentralized (e.g. design and/or implementation)  
 
While it is still too early to come up with a rule of thumb on when the first or second 
type of decentralized decision-making structure should be applied the cases seems to 
suggest the following. First, that industries relying on highly localized idiosyncratic 
knowledge tend to benefit most from a decision-making structure based on regional 
government bodies. The Jepara furniture cluster can illustrate this. The case points to 
how the regional government has been effective in identifying some the weakest and 
most crucial nodes in the regional innovation system with respect to the 
internationalization of the clustered SMEs.  Secondly, industries relying on global 
standards and/or high capital entry-barriers tend to be best facilitated by the central 
government premises located in the region. This comes out most clearly in the 
Bangalore IT software case where the central government’s ISS policies have been 
important in the development of the cluster and the educational institutions function 
well despite being under central rule. The Thai automobile case also suggests the need 
for a strategy based on decentralization of central government bodies as scale 
economies benefit from a centrally coordinated strategy.   
 
Soft and hard infrastructure 
 
The appropriate territorial decision-making structure assures the provision of 
information on weak nodes and complementarities in the RIS/cluster and thus on 
where and how to intervene with respect to the soft and hard infrastructure. The 
industry specific RIS policies can draw on a palette of different supply and/or demand 
side policies. Among these the can focus on providing timely and qualified human 
resources, supporting the creation of social capital and effective networks between 
SMEs and TNCs, supplying physical infrastructure, business support services and 
financial capital and supporting access to markets 
 Industry and institutional contingencies dictate what are the areas (hard and soft 
infrastructure) in which a governmental intervention is most needed in the RIS e.g. 
investments in human capital, or scientific infrastructure, etc).  
 
Before presenting the case specificities it should be noted that across all the cases the 
Asian SMEs innovative performance tend to constrained by lack of managerial skills 
in the broadest sense, especially of the manager or owner of the firm. Intervention in 
this area seems to be critical for all Asian industries considered in the study.  
 
In traditional industries as illustrated by the Jepara furniture cluster in Indonesia the 
major weakness in for the SMEs in the cluster is upgrading the local craftsmanship to 
meet international demands. This can be solved partly if local manufacturers can link 
up to international buyers and international markets directly. This is possible when 
they are price competitive, provide the right design, comply with required 
international standards (environmental mainly) and are known actors on the 
international market. For SMEs not possessing the skills needed for harvesting the 
benefits from collaborating directly or indirectly with international buyers the 
government needs to provide  information on international demands, standards and 
international markets and facilitate the access to international markets (for example, 
supporting the presence of local SMEs in international trade fairs). However, 
providing information is only one variable in the equation. SMEs also need to change 
their productive competences according to the demands of the global markets. 
Regional governments can facilitate the acquisition of new competences through 
training tailored to the specificities of the local industry and the global markets. This 
will lead to an improvement in the absorptive capacity of the SME.  
 
In resource-based industries the weakest node constraining SMEs innovative 
performance is the lack of competencies allowing SMEs to move up in the global 
value chain.  Success stories like the wine and salmon production in Chile or the 
Taiwan case in our paper show that this can be attained by linking the industry to 
biotechnology research. Central in the policy interventions is the collaboration 
between the knowledge providers (universities and research institutions) and the 
producers as well as the provision of hard scientific infrastructure and qualified 
human capital. This type of collaboration can facilitate, for example, the invention of 
new species, more resistant ones, or similar. Local producers can then enter 
international market with a knowledge intensive new product, creating a new niche 
market. This is clearly the strategy of Taiwan, which attempts to become a world 
leader in orchid production.  The government has a crucial role to play as this strategy 
requires significant investments in research facilities that exceed SMEs capacity. But 
hard infrastructure is only one part of the system. The linkages between the 
knowledge infrastructure (biotech labs for example), the producers and the markets 
need to be in place and SMEs need to have the knowledge to understand the 
possibilities of the new products (absorptive capacity).  
 
The policies in CoPS, like the Thai automotive clusters illustrate, are highly 
dependent on the TNCs willingness to provide assistance on technological upgrading 
and building of design competencies as this is beyond the scope of the indigenous 
SMEs. When TNCs provide this type of information/assistance it is mainly to first tier 
suppliers. SMEs do not play a significant role as first tier suppliers as most indigenous 
SMEs do not comply with the international quality standards required by the TNC. The cases illustrate that at least two strategies are possible. One is to regulate the 
relationship between the TNC and the SME, for example, forcing the TNC to 
subcontract with indigenous SMEs. While this might seem a viable solution in the 
short term, it does not provide the right incentives for the SMEs to acquire new 
competences, as the Thai case shows. The second strategy is for the Government to 
focus directly on improving the competences of the indigenous SMEs. This calls for 
government intervention focusing on providing the needed industry specific technical 
and managerial training and the development of indigenous technologies.   
 
Finally the policies targeting specialized supplier as illustrated by the Bangalore case 
initially consists in building the required human capital level engage in cost-based 
collaboration with TNCs. One that this level is attained the largest problem that the 
SMEs in these types of industries in Asia are currently facing is getting the high-value 
assignments that would allow them position in higher parts of the value chain. While 
the SMEs might have the formally needed competencies for undertaking these 
activities, TNCs do know or do not trust yet the ability of the indigenous SMEs to 
undertake these activities. This prevents them from transforming their formal 
competencies into ‘real’ competencies; this transformation requires user-producer 
interaction. This problem is central as the SMEs cannot rely on localized lead users. 
In parallel knowledge tend not to be distributed within the clusters of co-located 
firms. Thus after initial phases with investments in human capital public interventions 
should focus on public procurements allowing where the public government bodies 





Contrary to the tendency of one size fits all, we have argued that the needs of the 
SMEs and the regional system of innovation respond to industry specificities. For 
policy makers the selection of the areas of intervention as well as the instruments has 
to be the result of a throughout analysis of the regional system of innovation, 
particularly, of the hard and soft infrastructure and the complementarities between the 
different elements. The governments need accurate and timely information on the 
specific needs of the clusters of SMEs located in a given region. For this reason, 
generally we plea in favor of regionalized innovation policy infrastructures, both for 
the design and the implementation of the innovation policy.  The cases also illustrate 
that a) all hard and soft infrastructure elements are needed for the development of the 
clustered SMEs but that b) the relative importance of each of them will vary 





We started the paper with the general claim that innovation policies in Asia have 
tended to support high-tech sectors dominated by large firms. It is estimated that only 
3% of the SMEs benefit from this policies (as they are high-tech SMEs). The cases 
have illustrated that SMEs across industries do have an unrealized potential. They can 
compete in international markets, even in mature or traditional industries, if there is 
the right support locally.  
 Unfolding this potential is a matter of understanding the specific needs of the local 
SMEs and identifying the weakest nodes in the regional system of innovation. In 
order to reach the largest amount of SMEs policy makers need to focus on clusters of 
SMEs, that is, the policy target should be groups of SMEs and not isolated SMEs.  
 
This paper has contributed to the current discussion of innovation policies in Asia in 
many ways. First, by providing an analytical framework (RIS) to unfold the system 
propensities in which the activity of the SMEs is embedded (hard and soft 
infrastructure and how they relate to the SMEs needs and the use of the innovation 
system approach in practice). Second, by particularizing the analysis to the four most 
common clusters of SMEs in Asia, identifying some general patterns within the 
cluster and the main differences across clusters. And finally, by providing some 
guidance to policy makers on how to intervene support these clusters with the 
provision of hard and soft infrastructure.  
 
 





Acs, Z. and D. B. Audretsch (1990). Innovation and Small Firms. Cambridge, MA., 
MIT Press. 
Albu, M. (1997). Technological Learning and Innovation in Industrial Clusters in the 
South. SPRU electronic working papers, SPRU, University of Sussex. 
Amin, A. (2004) Regions unbound: towards a new politics and place. Geografiska 
Annaler B, 86 (1) 31-42. 
Amin A  2004: Regulating economic globalization. Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers , 29 (2): 217-233. 
Andreassi, T. (2003). Innovation in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. 
International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 3(1/2): 
99-106. 
Archibugi, D; Pietrobelli, C, (2003) The globalization of technology and its 
implications for developing countries - Windows of opportunity or further 
burden?, Technological Forecasting And Social Change, 70/9 pp 861-883. 
Asheim B and Cooke P (1999):  Local learning and interactive innovation networks in 
a global economy. In: E Malecki and P. Oinäs eds, Making Connections. 
Ashgate, Aldershot 1999, 145-178. 
Asheim, B. T. and L. Coenen (2005). Knowledge Bases and Regional Innovation 
Systems: Comparing Nordic Clusters. Research Policy 34(8): 1173. 
Asheim, B., L. Coenen and M. Svensson-Henning (2003). Nordic SMEs and Regional 
Innovation Systems - Final Report. Lund, Lund University: 95. 
Asheim, B. and M. Gertler (2004). The Geography of Innovation: Regional 
Innovation Systems. The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. J. Fagerberg, d. 
Mowery and r. Nelson. Oxford, OUP: 291-317. 
Asheim, B. and Gertler, M. S. (2005) Regional Innovation Systems and the 
Geographical Foundations of Innovation. In: J Fagerberg, D Mowery & R 
Nelson eds, The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  Asheim, B. and A. Isaksen (2002). Regional Innovation System: The Integration of 
Local 'Sticky' and Global 'Ubiquitous' Knowledge. Journal of Technology 
Transfer 27: 77-86. 
Asheim, B., A. Isaksen, C. Nauwelaers and F. Toedtling (2003). Regional Innovation 
Policy for Small-Medium Enterprises. Cheltenham, UK, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Asheim, B. and Vang, J. (Forthcoming) Regions, Absorptive Capacity and Strategic 
Coupling with High-Tech TNCs: Lessons from India and China. forthcoming in 
Society, Science and Technology, Sage 
Audretsch, D. B. (1995). Innovation and Industry Evolution. Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press. 
Avnimelech, G. and Teubal M. (2002) Venture capital in Israel. A comparative 
analysis and lessons for other countries. Hebrew University Israel. 
http://economics.huji.ac.il/facultye/teubal/VCPolicyBrusselsDraft2.pdf 
Bell, M. and M. Albu (1999). Knowledge Systems and Technological Dynamism in 
Industrial Clusters in Developing Countries. World Development 27(9): 1715-
1734. 
Berry, A., E. Rodriguez and H. Sandee (2002). Firm and Group Dynamics in the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Sector in Indonesia. Small Business Economics 
18: 141-161. 
Bitran, E. (2004). Sistema De Innovación, Consorcios Tecnológicos Y Clusters 
Dinámicos En Chile. En Foco. Santiago de Chile, Expansiva: 16. 
Bradsher, K. (2004). Orchids Flourish in Taiwanese Production Line. The New York 
Times. 
Burger, K., D. Kameo and H. Sandee (2001). Clustering of Small Agro-Processing 
Firms in Indonesia. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 
2(3/4): 289-299. 
Clarysse, B. and M. Uytterhaegen (1999). Inside the Black Box of Innovation: 
Strategic Differences between SMEs, University of Ghent. 
Cohen, W. and D. Levinthal (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 128-152. 
Cooke, P. and K. Morgan (1998). The Associational Economy: Firms, Regions and 
Innovation. Oxford, OUP. 
Cooke, P. and D. Will (1999). Small Firms, Social Capital and the Enhancement of 
Business Performance through Innovation Programmes. Small Business 
Economics 13: 219-234. 
Das, T. (2003). Promoting Resource-Based Export Oriented Smes in Asia and the 
Pacific. Investment promotion and enterprise development bulletin for Asia and 
the Pacific 1: 33-76. 
Dhungana, B. (2003). "Strengthening the Competitiveness of Small and Medium 
Enterprises in the  Globalisation Process: Prospects and Challenges." Investment 
promotion and enterprise development bulletin for Asia and the Pacific 1: 1-32. 
Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J. and Kreye, O.  1980.  The New International Division of 
Labor.  Cambridge:  Cambridge U. Press. 
Garreau, J.  1991.  Edge City: Life on the New Frontier.  New York: Doubleday.  
Giuliani, E. (2004). Laggard Clusters as Slow Learners, Emerging Clusters as Locus 
of Knowledge Cohesion (and Exclusion): A Comparative Study in the Wine 
Industry. LEM Working papers. Pisa, Laboratory of Economics and Management 
-Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies: 38. 
Giuliani, E. and M. Bell (2005). When Micro Shapes the Meso: Learning Networks in 
a Chilean Wine Cluster. Research Policy 34(1): 47-68. Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embedeness. American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510. 
Hsieh, S.-C. (2001). Taiwan Assisted Flower Production and Marketing in Paraguay, 
ICDF report. 
Kaufmann, A. and F. Tödtling (2002). How Effective Is Innovation Support for 
Smes? An Analysis of the Region of Upper Austria. Technovation 22: 147-159. 
Lall, S. and Narula, R. (2004) FDI and its Role in Economic Development: Do We 
Need a New Agenda. European Journal of Development Research,  16 (3) 447 - 
464. 
Lecler, Y. (2002) The Cluster Role in the Development of the Thai Car Industry: 
Some Evidence from Empirical Studies. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research Volume 26.4 December, pp. 799–814 
Liu, S.-J. (1998). "Industrial Development and Industrial Adaptation in Taiwan: Some 
Issues of Learned Entrepreneurship." IEEE Transactions on engineering 
management 45(4): 338-347. 
Loebis, L. and H. Schmitz (2005). Java Furniture Makers: Winners or Losers from 
Globalisation? Development and practice, IDS, Sussex: 10. 
Lundvall, B.-A. and S. Borrás (2004). Science, Technology and Innovation Policy. 
The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery and R. Nelson. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Lundvall, B.-Å., Borras, S. (1997) The Globalising Learning Economy: Implications 
for Innovation Policy. Luxembourg: European Communities. 
Lundvall, B.-A., B. Dalum and B. Johnson (1992). Public Policy in the Learning 
Society. National Systems of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and 
Interactive Learning. B.-Ä. Lundvall. London, Pinter: 296-317. 
Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P. (2004): The elusive concept of localization economies: 
towards a knowledge-based theory of spatial clustering. In: Grabher,G. and 
Powell,W.W., (Eds.) Networks. Edward Elgar Series Critical Studies in 
Economic Institutions Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Martin, R. and P. Sunley (2003). Deconstructing Clusters: Chaotic Concept or Policy 
Panacea? Journal of Economic Geography(3): 5-35. 
Murphy, M. (2002). Industry Issues: Organizational Change and Firm Performance. 
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. OECD. Paris, OECD. 
Mylteka, L. and F. Farinelli (2000). Local Clusters, Innovation Systems and Sustained 
Competitiveness. INTECH Discussion Paper Series. Maastricht. 
Nadvi, K. (1995), Industrial Clusters and Networks: Case Studies of SME Growth 
and Innovation, UNIDO, Vienna 
Narula R and Marin A (2005) ‘Exploring the relationship between direct and indirect 
spillovers from FDI in Argentina’.  MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum 
series 2005-024. 
NASSCOM (2005) www.nasscom.org. Accessed on September 20, 2005 
Nelson, R. and S. Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge-MA, Harvard University Press. 
OECD (1997)  Oslo Manual (Second Edition). París, OECD. Mimeo: 91. 
OECD (2002)  Enhancing Competitiveness of Smes through Innovation. Paris. 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, B. and K. Lal (2004). "Learning New Technologies by Smes in 
Developing Countries." INTECH Discussion Paper Series(2004-9): 38. 
Paldam, M (2000) Social Capital: One or Many? Definition and Measurement. 
Journal of Economic Surveys 14 (5): 629-53. Parthasarathy, B (2004) India's Silicon Valley or Silicon Valley's India? Socially 
Embedding the Computer Software Industry in Bangalore. International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, 28 (3) 664-85.  
Pietrobelli, C. and R. Rabellotti (2004). Upgrading in Clusters and Value Chains in 
Latinamerica: The Role of Policies. Sustainable department Best Practices 
Series. New York, Inter-American Development Bank: 97. 
Porter R., 1998. Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Business 
Review 
Ramachandran V (1993): technology transfer, firm ownership and investment in 
human capital. Review of Economics and Statitics 75: 664-670 
Ricyt (2001). Normalizacion De Indicadores De Innovacion Tecnologica En America 
Latina y El Caribe. Manual De Bogota. Bogota, Red Iberoamericana de 
Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología (RICYT) / Organización de Estados 
Americanos (OEA): 102. 
Romer, Paul M., Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political Economy, 
October 1990, 98 (5), S71{S102. 
Sanchez, M. P. and C. Chaminade (1998). El Proceso De Innovación En Las 
Empresas Españolas. Análisis De Las Encuestas De Innovación. Madrid, 
Fundación COTEC. 
Sandee, H. 1998. Promoting Small-Scale and Cottage Industry Clusters in Indonesia. 
Small Enterprise Development, 9: 52–58. 
Sandee, H. and P. Rietveld (2001). Upgrading Traditional Technologies in Small-
Scale Industry Clusters: Collaboration and Innovation Adoption in Indonesia. 
Journal of Development Studies 37(4): 150-172. 
Schmitz, H. (1992). On the Clustering of Small Firms. IDS bulletin - Institute of 
Development Studies(23): 64-69. 
Sevilla, R. C. and Soonthornthada, K (2000) SME Policy in Thailand: Vision and 
Challenges, Nakhon Pathom: Institute for Population and Social Research, 
Mahidol University. 
Taiwan council of agriculture (2003) COA Annual Report 2003. http:// 
www.coa.gov.tw/coa/end/publications/ 
Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs (2004) White paper on Small and Medium size 
enterprises in Taiwan.  
Tambunan T., 2005, Promoting small and medium enterprises with a clustering 
approach : a  policy experience from Indonesia, Journal of Small Business 
Management, 43 (2), 138-154.  
Techakanont, K. (2003). An Analysis of the Determinant of Inter-firm Technology 
transfer: A case of the Thai Automobile Industry Thammasat Economic Journal 
Vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 145-173 
Techakanont, K. and T. Terdudomtham. (2004) Evolution of Inter-firm Technology 
Transfer and Technological Capability Formation of Local Parts Firms in the 
Thai Automobile Industry”, Journal of Technology Innovation Vol. 12, No. 2, 
pp. 151-183. 
Tsai, J. (2001). The Comparative Advantage of Taiwan's Major Cut Flowers. 
Agricultural Economics 47(6): 265-270. 
Tsai, K.-H. and J.-C. Wang (2002). An Examination of Taiwan's Innovation Policies 
and R&D Performance, Division of Taiwan Economy, Chung-Hua Institution for 
Economic Research: 21. Tunzelmann, N. V. and V. Acha (2004). Innovation in 'Low-Tech' Industries. The 
Oxford Handbook of Innovation. J. Fagerberg. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
407-432. 
Unido (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) (1997). Progress and 
Prospects for Industrial Development in Least Developed Countries (Ldsc) - 
Towards the 21st Century. Fourth LDC Ministerial Symposium: Industrial 
Capacity Building and Entrepreneurship Development in LDCs with particular 
emphasis on agro-related industries. Vienna. 
Unido (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and U. U. N. D. 
Program) (2004). Partnerships for Small Enterprise Development. New York, 
United Nations: 46. 
Vang, J & Overby M (forthcoming) Transnational Communities, TNCs and 
Development: The Case of the Indian IT-services Industry”, forthcoming in 
Lundvall B.-Å., Patarapong I & Vang J eds, Asia’s Innovation Systems in 
Transition. Elgar. 
Veselka, M. (2005). Taiwan's Economic Development: The Role of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises Beyond the Statistics. Second conference of the 
European Association of Taiwan Studies. Ruhr University Bochum. 
Von Hippel, E. (1988). Sources of Innovation. Oxford, OUP. 
World Bank (1998): Social Capital in Africa. Downloaded from 
http://www.worldbank.org. 
World Bank (2002). Understanding and Measuring Social Capital. A 
Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners. New York, World Bank. 
World Bank (2003) World Development Indicators 2003. 
Zahra, S.A., and George, G. 2002. Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization, 






 Table 1. The Economic importance of SMEs in a selection of Asian countries 
in the nineties 
Country Economic  relevance 
Bangladesh  -  80-95 % of the manufacturing establishments are SMEs 
-  SMEs are responsible for 80% of the labour force 
-  They account for 50% of the output of the sector and 5% of the GDP. 
-  Most prominent sectors: garments, footwear and agro-processing 
India  - 95% of the industrial establishments 
- 80% of employment 
- 40% of industrial output, 35% of the manufacturing sector, 40% of exports 
and 7% of NDP 
Pakistan  -  80% of industrial employment 
-  60% of industrial output 
-  15% of GDP 
Nepal (1)  -  89 % of establishments 
-  87% of employment 
-  63% of the total manufacturing added value 
Indonesia  -  70-90% of establishments 
-  20% of the GDP 
Thailand  -  98% of the establishments 
-  70 % of industrial employment 
-  4,7 % of added value in manufacturing 
-  Main industries: metal and steel, plastic products, rubber and 
garments 
Malaysia  -  93% of the establishments 
-  80% of the manufacturing firms 
-  Only 17,5 of employment in the manufacturing sector 
-  30 % of the total output 
Philippines  -  99 % of enterprises 
-  45% of employment 
-  28% of the value added in the manufacturing sector 
Singapore  -  Estimated 40% of the manufacturing production 
-  25% of the value added in manufacturing 
Korea  -  70 % of employment 
-  46% of gross output 
-  47 % of value added  
Taiwan (2)  -  98% of the firms are classified as SMEs 
-  31,5 % of the total sales 
-  77,5 % of the workforce 
-  28,11 of the production of the manufacturing sector 
(1)  Data is not including Cottage industries that is, traditional industries that utilize specific (indigenous) skills 
or local raw materials and resources, labour intensive and are based on national tradition, art and culture 
(United Nation Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2003). 
(2)  Data of 2001 
Source: based on (Dhungana 2003), Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics and SMEA (2004).  Table 2. Distribution of employment and value added among manufacturing 
sectors in a selection of asian countries (1) 
Country  ISIC sector  % employment  %  manufacturing 
added value 
India  Food and beverages  16,1  12,2 
 Textiles  17,1  12,4 
  Chemical and chemical products  9,6  15,7 
Indonesia  Food and beverages  13,9  13,6 
 Textiles  15,7  12,6 
 Tobacco  products  6,0 8,9 
Philippines  Food and beverages  16,8  29,8 
  Chemical and chemical products  5,0  12,0 
  Coke, refined petroleum products  0,2  9,7 
Korea  Radio, TV and communication 
equipment 
9,7 16,2 
  Chemical and chemical products  5,4  9,5 
  Motor vehicles, trailers  8,0  8,7 
Singapore  Office and computing machinery  12,6  22,5 
  Radio, TV and communication 
equipment 
17,4 19,4 
  Chemical and chemical products  6,4  18,5 
China  Chemical and chemical products  11,1  12,0 
  Food and beverages  8,2  10,2 
 Basic  metals  8,3 9,0 
Sri Lanka  Food and beverages  14,1  26,4 
  Wearing apparel, fur products  33,3  18,4 
 Tobacco  products  5,6 12,2 
Thailand  Food and beverages  19,0  25,4 
  Motor vehicles, trailers  3,9  10,8 
 Non-metallic  mineral  products  6,4 8,6 
(1)  Total added value of manufacturing= 100. Three most important sectors according to added value. 
Source: UNIDO, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 2002 taken from (Das 2003) 
 
 Table 3. Comparison of the Asian cases 
    Traditional
Jepara cluster 
Resource-based 




Software Bangalore  
Main cluster 
features 
About 2000 SMEs 
Production goes to international 
markets 
 
Production dominated by small 
farms (1 ha per family) 
 
Strongly dominated by TNC 
assemblers. Local SMEs are 
usually 2
nd and 3
rd tier, with very 
limited access to knowledge and 
technology. 
Cluster with strong presence of 








Innovation is customer driven.  
But most firms do not have direct 
access to the large international 
buyer. 
Joint actions to attend 
international trade fairs 
(supported by the government) 
have been very successful 
Innovation is science-driven 
High coordination between 
researchers – maket- 
producers is needed. 
Boundary spanners. 
Government can play a role in 
supporting the interaction 
between these institutions 
Innovation is TNC driven. The 
TNC defines the scope of 
change and only SMEs that are 
1
st ties have access to 
knowledge and information on 
the market. SMEs that want to 
be part of the TNC network need 
to comply with international 
quality standards. Only 10% of 
the SMEs have an ISO 
certification. Government has a 
great role encouraging and 
supporting SMEs to obtain such 
quality standard. 
Innovation is customer driven.  
But for many firms the customer is the 
TNC. They work on job-work basis, as 
subcontractors, and their scope for 
upgrading and innovating is limited. 
Another group of SMEs have opted to be 
independent. They have better chances 
to enter international markets, if they are 
able to gain recognition. Support from the 
government to attend international trade 
fairs could have a positive impact. 
Human Capital  Craft industry. Knowledge 
acquisition is by learning by 
doing. There are a limited 
number of very qualified human 
resources that are shared by 
several SMEs and large firms. 
Policy makers can support the 
transfer of this knowledge?. 
Managerial and marketing skills 
are needed. 
Knowledge is very fragmented 
in three groups. Producers 
only know about production 
techniques, but nothing about 
the market. Marketing of the 
flowers is dominated by 
“marketing” firms.  And 
innovation in the cluster is 
driven by advances in 
biotechnology, with 
researchers in labs relatively 
isolated from producers and 
markets. 
Production is dominated by blue 
collar workers.  Competition is 
based on costs, quality 
standards and to a lesser extent 
on just in time.  Learning is 
limited as production is 
according to blueprints. 
Upgrading requires formal 
training in engineering and 
design.   
Firms have easy access to qualified 
human resources. The region houses an 
important number of education and 
training institutions. So the technical skills 
are ensured. However, managerial and 
marketing skills could be strengthen.  
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    Traditional
Jepara cluster 
Resource-based 




Software Bangalore  
Social capital & 
networks 
Social capital is strong, 
based on kinship and family 
ties. Collective action is 
common, both to access 
machinery and to attain 
economies of scale.  
Social capital is strong, 
based on Chinese values 
and collective action 
common. However, 
networks seem to be 
confined to one activity 
(production, research or 
commercialization).  
Social capital is weak.  Some 
initiatives like the Toyota’s sponsored 
Automobile Industry Club only 
reaches first tiers. Collaboration 
between the SMEs and collective 
action is almost inexistent, not even 
to achieve efficiency based on 
specialization. Government could 
support the introduction of quality 
standards to groups of 
complementary SMEs.    
Social capital is based on the alumni 
network and the mobility of workers. 
Collective action exits, specially for 
marketing purposes and to a lesser extent 
to share technological knowledge or gain 
economies of scale. However, collective 
action has been hampered by fierce 
competition between the firms. Cooperation 
is successful when based on specialization. 
Government could play a role supporting 
collective initiatives of complementary firms 
and providing information of the SMEs core 
business. 
Financial Capital  Weak support by financial 
institutions. Cluster works on 
micro credits among the 
producers (based on social 
capital) 
The upgrading of the cluster 
via investment in research 
and technology requires vast 
amounts of financial capital 
provided by the government 
and some international large 
firms.  
Introducing quality standards is a 
costly process. Most of the SMEs in 
the cluster do not have any access to 
financial capital. Only SMEs in the 
first tier might benefit from some 
support from the TNC.  
VC market in India suffers from excessive 
regulations and bureaucracy.  Funding is 
provided by some TNC and members of the 
transnational community returning from the 
US (or just setting up some business in 
India). Public procurement is non-existent.  
Policy  The presence of the 
government in the cluster 
has been limited. However, 
some of the initiatives (like 
promoting the attendance to 
international trade fairs) 
have been very successful. 
More support for the 
development of human 
capital, specially managerial 
and marketing skills, 
provision of information on 
international trends and 
facilitating direct access to 
the customer is needed.    
Success in this cluster is 
based on coordination of the 
different actors (producers, 
researchers and customers) 
as well, access to 
information on international 
opportunities and trends and 
the provision of 
infrastructure (scientific 
mainly). The government 
has a great role to play in 
setting the RIS infrastructure 
and connecting the relevant 
actors.  
 
Latest Thai policy towards the sector 
has been quite detrimental for the 
SMEs as it eliminated the obligations 
of TNC to local manufacturers. 
Government has a role to play in the 
provision of soft and hard 
infrastructure for the cluster: 
qualification of human resources, 
introduction of quality standards, 
support of collective action and 
specialization (upgrading in the value 
change), encouraging a change of 
strategy from cost reduction to quality 
and specialization (knowledge 
based), and put back the obligations 
of TNC towards indigenous SMEs. 
Government has an important role 
fomenting collective actions among SMEs 
in the cluster, focusing on specialization 
and not competition. Assistance for 
international trade fairs could facilitate the 
insertion of these SMEs in international 
market. Public procurement could also be a 
powerful incentive for the local SMEs. 
Finally, upgrading managerial skills to 
complement the high technical skills is 
needed.   
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